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Abstract 
Is federal Indian law dead? Despite a declining docket during the Rehnquist 
Court, the Supreme Court continued to take a disproportionately high number of Indian 
law cases – and deciding more than 75 percent of them against tribal interests. While 
many scholars suggest that the Court’s conservative views drive these Indian law 
decisions and criticize the Court for failing to follow foundational principles of federal 
Indian law, this Article asserts that the Court’s reasons for granting certiorari and for 
deciding against tribal interests in these cases are not Indian law-related. Instead, the 
Court identifies important, unrelated constitutional concerns that appear to arise more 
frequently in Indian law cases, decides those matters, and only then turns to the federal 
Indian law questions. Once the Court disposes of the important constitutional concern in 
its analysis, the Court’s federal Indian law analysis is secondary and often driven by 
pragmatism. This Article concludes by arguing that advocates for tribal interests must 
locate an important constitutional concern or a significant pragmatic consideration that 
will drive the Court’s analysis before they will turn around the win-loss ratio.  
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Leech Lake Ojibwe novelist David Treuer stirred up controversy in Indian 
Country by declaring in his new book of literary criticism that “Native American fiction 
does not exist.”1 The New York Times described the book as “a kind of manifesto, which 
argues that Native American writing should be judged as literature, not as a cultural 
artifact, or as a means of revealing the mystical or sociological core of Indian life to non-
Natives.”2 Treuer uses the trickster story “Wenebozho and the Smartberries” – in which 
the Anishinaabe trickster Wenebozho3 tricks a not-so-smart Indian guy into eating small, 
dried turds by calling them “smartberries”4 – as the punch line to his argument focusing 
on Turtle Mountain Band Chippewa writer Louise Erdrich:5
[I]f you insist on believing that Love Medicine is a cultural 
document and that you can reach an understanding of its delicious magic 
without looking at it as a literary production in relation to other literary 
productions, and if you really want to use notions of desire instead of from 
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1 DAVID TREUER, NATIVE AMERICAN FICTION: A USER’S MANUAL 191 (2006). 
2 Dinitia Smith, American Indian Writing, Seen Through a New Lens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at B9. 
3 Alternate spellings include “Waynaboozhoo,” EDWARD BENTON-BENAI, THE MISHOMIS BOOK: THE 
VOICE OF THE OJIBWE 29 (1979) (Indian Country Press, Inc. 1981), and “Nanabush,” JOHN BORROWS,
RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 17 (2002). 
4 TREUER, supra note __, at 50-52 (quoting Rose Foss, Why Wenaboozhoo Is So Smart, 4 OSHKAABEWIS 
NATIVE J. 33-34 (1997)). 
5 See id. at 29-68 (criticizing LOUISE ERDRICH, LOVE MEDICINE (1993)). 
3knowledge as a way to make sense of it, then come with me, over here 
next to the trail: I’ve got some smartberries for you to eat.6
Drawing from Treuer’s example, this Article posits that federal Indian law7 does 
not exist. Or, to put it in a more accurate way, federal Indian law as practiced before the 
United States Supreme Court is in serious decline 8 – and most likely has been so since 
the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist in 19869 and the concomitant reduction of the 
Supreme Court’s docket.10 And, as a corollary, much of the federal Indian law understood 
as deriving from cases about Indians – cases that explored and defined the rights and 
responsibilities of tribes and individual Indians, cases that could not have existed but for 
some unique legal characteristic that only the presence of a tribal interest brought out – is 
not really about Indians. Scholars and practitioners both believe that federal Indian law – 
 
6 David Treuer, Smartberries: Interpreting Erdrich’s Love Medicine, 29 AMER. INDIAN CULTURE AND 
RESEARCH J. 21, 36 (2005). This paragraph is reproduced in somewhat altered form in Treuer’s book at the 
end of the chapter called “Smartberries.” TREUER, supra note __, at 68. The journal article version is 
starker. 
7 “Federal Indian law” will be used interchangeably with the constitutional common law developed by the 
Supreme Court and other courts with Judge Canby’s definition of “federal Indian law,” which is defined as 
“that body of law dealing with the status of the Indian tribes and their special relationship to the federal 
government, with all the attendant consequences for the tribes and their members, the states and their 
citizens, and the federal government.” WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 
(4th ed. 2004). See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1-3 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. 
eds. 2005) (hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED.). “Federal Indian law” includes statutes, treaties, 
regulations, and other codified law, as well as the federal common law interpreting these statutes, although 
this Article will focus on the constitutional common law announced in the Court’s Indian cases.  
 Examples of the declaration and application of federal Indian “common” law abound. E.g., County 
of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. 470 U.S. 226, 233-36 (1985) (finding a federal common 
law cause of action for tribes and the United States to enforce the Trade and Intercourse Acts, 25 U.S.C. § 
177); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (holding as a matter of federal 
common law that Indian tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
8 This Article, however, does not posit that Indian law as practiced before federal, state, and tribal courts, 
administrative agencies, and in everyday practice – and that is taught in law schools – is not as robust and 
dynamic as any cutting edge field of law. It is. 
9 See generally Ralph W. Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 
PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1991). 
10 See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1665, 1672 (2006) (the “incredibly shrinking docket”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its 
Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368-76 (2006). At the 
same time, the docket appears to be shrinking even further. See Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling 
Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A1. 
4to use Treuer’s phrasing – “is a cultural document and that you can reach an 
understanding of i[t] … without looking at it as a [legal] production in relation to other 
[legal] products….”11 What scholars and practitioners should do – even if they do not buy 
the argument that federal Indian law no longer exists – is look at the last 20 years of 
federal Indian law through a lens of assuming that the cases have nothing to do with 
Indians or Indian tribes. Federal Indian law as the modern Supreme Court reads and 
understands it begins to make more sense that way. 
 A critical premise of this Article is that the Court applies its decision making 
discretion to decide the “important” constitutional concern first and then the Court 
decides any remaining federal Indian law questions in order to reach a result consistent 
with its decision on the important constitutional concern. Given that federal Indian law is 
malleable (according to the way the Court reads Indian law) even in comparison to, for 
example, the Court’s federalism or statutory interpretation jurisprudence, the 
inconsistencies and seeming intellectual dishonesty in the Indian law side of the 
decisionmaking is unsurprising. 
 This Article attempts a fresh look at the Court’s Indian cases from more of a 
“positive rather than a normative analysis….”12 This Article’s goal is to give “systematic 
attention to … implications for Supreme Court decisionmaking” in the context of federal 
Indian law.13 The argument begins with a description of several classic Indian law cases 
in Part I. Each of these cases represents a vital and dynamic part of Indian law – and form 
a part of the core of the Indian law canon – but they can be read as something other than 
 
11 TREUER, supra note __, at 68. 
12 Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 32 (2005). 
13 Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment – Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 66, 68 (2006). Professor Katyal’s paper on the strategies and preparations for litigating Hamdan v. 
Rumseld before the Supreme Court should be mandatory reading for tribal attorneys. 
5an Indian law case. In fact, each of these cases, while decided in reliance on Indian law 
principles, includes a separate, independent reason – legal, historical, pragmatic, and so 
on – for the outcome. 
 Part II introduces the current state of federal Indian law. Part II establishes that 
the Court makes decisions in the Indian law field not through reliance upon a rule of law 
or even through much reliance on precedent, but instead with reliance upon its view of 
the way things “ought to be,” as Justice Scalia once wrote in an internal memorandum.14 
The Court’s decisions reflect a “ruthless pragmatism” as a result of this view of Indian 
law.15 
Part III offers a fresh view of several of the Court’s most important Indian cases 
by placing the Court’s Indian caseload in the context of its larger trends. The most 
obvious trend is the severe decline in the Court’s docket. The decline in the caseload 
should mean that most of the Court’s Indian cases are decided in order to resolve a split 
in authority in the lower and state courts. But those splits in authority account for few 
cases. Other Indian law cases reach the Court because they raise or involve questions of 
important constitutional concern for the Court. It is a possibility that the declining docket 
means that the Court will hear fewer and fewer (if any) cases on their Indian law-related 
merits, but instead choose Indian law cases because they present an opportunity to opine 
on an important constitutional concern outside of Indian law. 
 Part III offers a new look at the Indian cases with an emphasis on locating an 
important constitutional concern unrelated to Indian law. A chart describing the Indian 
 
14 David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996). 
15 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 460 
(2005); see also id. at 436 (“ruthless pragmatism”). 
6law and non-Indian law-related issues decided by the Court in each of the Indian law 
decisions since 1986 reveals that a large majority of Indian law cases arguably are not
Indian law cases at all. 
 Part IV recommends that observers of federal Indian law begin to highlight the 
“important” constitutional questions that may arise in future Indian law cases. This 
Article does not recommend abandoning the quest for normative analyses and 
conclusions about Indian law, but instead recommends incorporating a positive aspect to 
the analysis. Part III concludes by applying the template to several cases rising through 
the federal court system that the Court may agree to hear in the coming years. If nothing 
else, identification of the important constitutional concerns involved in these cases will 
aid tribal advocates in predicting the relative chances of success before the Court. 
 Where observers go wrong, this Article asserts, is by ignoring the Supreme 
Court’s broader agenda, an agenda driven by its receding docket. This Article asserts that 
the Supreme Court grants petitions for writ of certiorari not because the Court wants to 
decide tribal interests or even to put Indians in their place. The Court does not care what 
happens in Indian Country. To assume the Court does care is unwarranted; there is no 
evidence whatsoever to suggest that the Court (as a whole) is invested in the concerns 
and issues in Indian Country, which is as far from the minds of the elite legal 
establishment as any issue can be. 
 What does interest the Court are constitutional questions of Congressional and 
Executive power; broader federalism issues unrelated to the place of Indian tribes in the 
federalism scheme; the legitimacy, sanctity, and authority of federal courts; and larger 
issues related to race and social issues. There is significant evidence to support these 
7assertions.16 These areas are now the significant areas of constitutional concern that 
attracts the Court’s attention. The fact that these constitutional concerns arise in Indian 
Country – both in modern times and throughout the Court’s history – often is accidental. 
But these issues do appear to arise in Indian Country on a consistent basis. That federal 
Indian law principles do not answer these broader questions is a significant reason why 
the Court deviates from Indian law principles and even appears to denigrate them. When 
tribal advocates recognize these broader constitutional concerns in advance of a 
certiorari petition, then the advocacy before the Court on behalf of tribal interests will 
improve, as will the win rate for tribal advocates. 
 To be fair to tribal advocates, in at least one recent case,17 counsel for tribal 
interests did make an attempt to bring forth to the Court pragmatic reasons outside the 
realm of federal Indian law justifying a decision in favor of tribal interests. This attempt 
failed and for explainable reasons, but future litigants should use the strategy as a 
template in future cases.  
 
I. A New Theory of Supreme Court Indian Law Decisionmaking 
 Consider the following fact patterns: 
• A court of the State of Georgia convicts an Indian man of murder and sentences 
him to death. The crime took place outside the jurisdiction of the state – on an 
Indian reservation. The defendant appeals to federal courts, seeking a writ habeas 
corpus. The United States Supreme Court grants the petition and issues an order 
 
16 See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J. L. & POL. 639, 
663-65 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 569, 585-86 (2003). 
17 Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005). 
8staying the execution. The State of Georgia then executes the man two days 
later.18 The Georgia legislature then passes a resolution asserting that the United 
States Supreme Court does not posses authority to review the decisions of 
Georgia state courts. The Court then agrees to hear a second case about the 
concomitant issue relating to the Georgia legislature’s repeated attempts to nullify 
treaties and other federal law.19 
• An Indian woman sues an Indian tribe in federal court seeking a declaration that 
the tribal membership ordinance is a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Indian Civil Rights Act.20 The Supreme Court grants certiorari.21 
• A federal district court issues a final order enjoining the State of Washington and 
its offers and agencies from interfering with Indians exercising fishing rights in 
accordance with an Indian treaty. The Ninth Circuit affirms the order and the 
Supreme Court denies certiorari. A state court then issues an order, later affirmed 
by the state supreme court, enjoining the State and its officers from enforcing the 
federal court order. The United States Supreme Court grants certiorari to resolve 
the split.22 
• Congress enacts a law prohibiting the harvesting of bald eagles. Anyone found in 
possession of eagle parts will be in violation of the law and subject to time in jail. 
Federal officers discover an Indian man in possession of bald eagle parts on an 
Indian reservation, of which the defendant is a member. He is prosecuted and 
 
18 See Georgia v. Tassels, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1930).  
19 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  
20 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8). 
21 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
22 See Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) 
(Fishing Vessel).  
9convicted in federal court. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the man 
argues that he was exercising rights guaranteed to his tribe and its member in 
accordance with an Indian treaty ratified long before the Congressional 
prohibition.23 
• A federal court enjoins the State of Minnesota and its agencies and political 
subdivisions from interfering with the off-reservation hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights of an Indian tribe. On appeal to the United State Supreme Court, 
the State argues that the President had nullified the treaty by issuing an Executive 
Order.24 
The previous fact patterns are simplified versions of cases that the Supreme Court 
has reviewed throughout American history. A quick review of the fact patterns would 
compel the reader to believe that they are federal Indian law cases. And, with the 
exception of the first part of the first fact pattern (a case made moot by the state), the 
parties to the cases argued and briefed the cases as though they were Indian law cases. 
Scholars who have critiqued and analyzed the cases have treated them as Indian law 
cases.25 In fact, these cases appear in prominent fashion in the two major casebooks on 
federal Indian law.26 These are classic cases that form a part of the backbone of federal 
Indian law. 
 But it could be argued that none of these cases are federal Indian law cases.  
 
23 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).  
24 See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (Mille Lacs).  
25 See supra notes __ to __.
26 See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, AND REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW:
NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 76-85 (rev. 4th ed. 2005) (Worcester); id. at 204-12 (Mille 
Lacs); id. at 469-75 (Dion); id. at  482-89 (Martinez); id. at 1249-61 (Fishing Vessel); DAVID H. GETCHES,
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AND ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
112-21 (5th ed. 2005) (Worcester); id. at 323-39 (Dion); id. at 391-97 (Martinez); id. at 863-72 (Fishing 
Vessel); id. at 880-88 (Mille Lacs). 
10 
 These cases highlight the possibility that federal Indian law does not exist and that 
perhaps it is a mistake to think of these cases as Indian law cases. In the last twenty years 
under the Rehnquist Court, for example, it is harder and harder to find Indian law 
Supreme Court decisions relying upon foundational principles of Indian law, especially 
those rooted in the Constitution. Such a conclusion should not be so surprising. 
Prominent constitutional law scholars suggest that there is no such thing as principled 
constitutional interpretation. For example, Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote: 
 In constitutional law … there are no such overarching interpretive 
precepts or protocols. There are no official interpretive rules at all. In any 
given case raising an undecided constitutional question, nothing in any 
current constitutional law stops a judge from relying on original intent, if 
the judge wishes. But nothing stops a judge from ignoring original intent, 
if a judge wishes. Or suppose a plaintiff comes to court asserting an 
unwritten constitutional right. Under current case law, judges are fully 
authorized to dismiss the right because the Constitution says nothing about 
it. Another admissible option, however, is to uphold the right on 
nontextual grounds. Evolving American values? Judges can consult them 
or have nothing to do with them.27 
Indian law scholars have been decrying the lack of principled decisionmaking about 
federal Indian law for decades.28 Nothing stops the Court – no constitutional provision, 
common law principle, or anything else – from working radical transformations of 
 
27 JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 5 (2006). 
28 E.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979); John Petoskey, Indians and the 
First Amendment, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 221 (Vine Deloria, Jr., ed. 
1985). 
11 
federal Indian law at any moment.29 The only constitutional provision mentioning Indian 
tribes is the Indian Commerce Clause.30 As with the rest of constitutional interpretation, 
there are no rules, except one – the Court looks for the familiar, a constitutional concern 
that attracts its attention.31 
The first fact pattern, based on Georgia v. Tassels 32 and Worcester v. Georgia,33 
involved questions of federalism and the supremacy of federal law over conflicting state 
laws.34 In that case, the State of Georgia issued a resolution proclaiming that the Supreme 
 
29 Consider City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005), which redrew the 
map relating to Indian land claims in a single instant. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 
266 (2nd Cir. 2005) (dismissing Indian land claims after 20 years of litigation by following the reasoning of 
Sherrill); Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA 
L. REV. 21 (2005). 
30 CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For more discussion of the background and possible limits of federal power 
under the Indian Commerce Clause, please see United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224-26 (2004) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-08 (2005); 
Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1; Clinton, 
There is No Supremacy Clause, supra note __; Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1069 (2004). 
31 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2004, at 57, 59. 
32 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830). For background material, please see TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY 
OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 111-15 
(2002); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 733-734 (red. ed. 1926). 
33 31 U.S. 515 (1931). For wide-ranging scholarly commentary on this very important case, please see 
RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND 
POLITICAL LIBERTY 58-61 (1980); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
118-19 (1982); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 181-83 (1985); TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE 
SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 175-90 (2002); PETRA T. 
SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEM 46-50 (1991) (Berg Publishers 1993); 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 754-61; G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 731-37 (1988); DAVID E. WILKINS, & K. 
TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 58-61 
(2001); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW 
AND PEACE, 1600-1800, at 132-33 (1999). Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, 
and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 521-25 (1969); William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal 
Sovereignty, and Worcester v. Georgia, 62 OR. L. REV. 127, 128-36, 139-41 (1983) (reviewing COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds. 1982) (hereinafter COHEN’S
HANDBOOK 1982 ED.). 
34 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559 (“The constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to 
be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the 
Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making 
treaties.”); id. at 561 (“[Georgia’s laws] interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United 
States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our 
constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the union.”); CURRIE, supra note __, at 181-
12 
Court had no jurisdiction or authority to review the decisions of state courts.35 The case 
arose in the larger national debate now known as the Nullification Crisis, where several 
Southern states argued that they had the authority to nullify federal statutes.36 Chief 
Justice Marshall believed these issues would arise in the 1832 Term in the form of a case 
involving the Second Bank of the United States, a critical focal point of the states’ rights 
debate, or the various attempts by states to declare the unconstitutionality of (or nullify) 
federal law.37 Instead, these issues appeared in a case arising out of Indian Country. All 
the necessary elements of the other cases were present for the Court to announce that 
federal law was supreme over conflicting state law, the underlying important 
constitutional concern. 
 The second fact pattern, probably the most famous, controversial, and important 
opinion favoring tribal interests issued in the last 100 years – Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
 
83; Burke, supra note __, at 512-13; Gerald N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 53 DUKE L. J. 875, 905-06 (2003). 
35 See 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 733-34. 
36 For commentary and background on the Nullification Crisis, please see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE 
AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 42 (2nd ed. Sanford Levinson, ed.); R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME 
COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 88 (1968); 1 WARREN, supra note __, at 770; David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress: The Public Lands, 1829-1861, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 783, 785 (2003); Michael J. 
Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1136 (2001); 
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. 
SOUTHERN HIST. 519 (1973); H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A 
Belated Review, 94 YALE L. J. 1285, 1292 (1985); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 945 (1985); Jill Norgren, Protection of What Rights They Have: 
Original Principles of Federal Indian Law, 64 N. D. L. REV. 73, 110 (1988); R. Kent Newmyer, John 
Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Southern States’ Rights Tradition, 33 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV.
875, 876 (2000). 
37 See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE REPUBLIC 357 (1949) (“To 
Marshall, the tariff issue seemed more dangerous to his principles. For the South . . . was not professing 
itself willing to obey any protective tariff law.”); id. at 356 (quoting letter to his son; “This session of 
Congress is indeed particularly interesting. The discussion on the tariff and on the Bank, especially, will, I 
believe call forth an unusual display of talents.”); see also Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the 
Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 348 (1956) (“While the President saw the Indian problem as a temporary 
one, the nullification issue presented a basic national crisis.”).  
13 
Martinez 38 – is a mere statutory interpretation case about whether the Indian Civil Rights 
Act may be read to imply a cause of action39 and to waive the sovereign immunity of a 
sovereign.40 It is tempting to focus on the tribal sovereignty or sex discrimination aspects 
of the case – and they are significant – but consider the underlying questions that 
interested the Court: whether sovereign immunity is waived where a civil rights statute 
does not have a specific cause of action to enforce those rights. Consider that if the Court 
construed the Act as implying a cause of action and waiving tribal sovereign immunity, 
such a precedent could be used against both federal and state sovereigns. 
 The third fact pattern, based on Washington v. Washington Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,41 included a major question relating to the 
granting of full faith and credit of federal court orders in state courts,42 a question about 
 
38 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For often intense commentary about the decision, see for example CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63-69 (1987); Judith Resnik, 
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989); 
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Gloria 
Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty Five Years of Disparate Cultural Visions, 14 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2004-2005). For the point of view of a Santa Clara Pueblo woman, please see 
Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Pueblo Woman, 14 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 (2004-2005). 
39 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60-61 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). 
40 See id. at 58-59. 
41 443 U.S 658 (1979). For commentary on the case, please see RUSSEL L. BARSH, THE WASHINGTON 
FISHING RIGHTS CONTROVERSY: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE 77-103 (1979); FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON 
TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS (1986); CHARLES F. 
WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN WAY 
(2000). 
42 See generally Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 669 n. 14 (“The impact of illegal regulation … and of illegal 
exclusionary tactics by non-Indians … in large measure accounts for the decline of the Indian fisheries 
during this century and renders that decline irrelevant to a determination of the fishing rights the Indians 
assumed they were securing by initialing the treaties in the middle of the last century.”) (citing Tulee v. 
Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)); id. at 672 n. 19 (“[T]he 
reason for our recent grant of certiorari on the question remains because the state courts are—and, at least 
since the State Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 86 Wash.2d 664, 548 
P.2d 1058 (1976), have been—on record as interpreting the treaties involved differently from the federal 
courts.”); id. at 673 (“When Fisheries was ordered by the state courts to abandon its attempt to promulgate 
and enforce regulations in compliance with the federal court’s decree—and when the Game Department 
simply refused to comply—the District Court entered a series of orders enabling it, with the aid of the 
United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington and various federal law enforcement 
agencies, directly to supervise those aspects of the State’s fisheries necessary to the preservation of treaty 
fishing rights.”) (citing United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash.), aff’d, 573 F.2d 
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the supremacy of federal law.43 This case can be seen as a rehash of Worcester. In this 
case, the culmination of dozens of lawsuits and federal and state court decisions, the 
Court was confronted with the fact that a state supreme court had interpreted a treaty in 
ways that conflicted with federal court interpretations. Moreover, lower state courts and 
state officials had a long history of violating federal court orders. Of course, this problem 
implicated the Court’s supervisory responsibility. 
 The fourth fact pattern, based on United States v. Dion,44 is a question about 
Congressional power to abrogate treaties with later-enacted legislation,45 not to mention 
the serious national worry that Bald Eagles and other kinds of eagles were near extinction 
at the time.46 The final fact pattern, based on Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa 
 
1123 (9th Cir. 1978); id. at 674 (“Because of the widespread defiance of the District Court’s orders, this 
litigation has assumed unusual significance. We granted certiorari in the state and federal cases to interpret 
this important treaty provision and thereby to resolve the conflict between the state and federal courts 
regarding what, if any, right the Indians have to a share of the fish, to address the implications of 
international regulation of the fisheries in the area, and to remove any doubts about the federal court’s 
power to enforce its orders.”) (citing Washington v. United States, 439 U.S. 909 (1978).  
43 CONST. art. IV, § 1 (requiring state courts to give full faith and credit to each other’s decisions); CONST.
art. VI, ¶ 2 (Supremacy Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (requiring state courts to give full faith and credit to 
federal courts and vice versa). 
44 476 U.S. 734 (1986). For commentary, please see Robert Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by 
Federal Statutes Protective of the Environment, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859, 862-868 (1991); Robert J. 
Miller, Speaking with Forked Tongues: Indian Treaties, Salmon, and the Endangered Species Act, 566-67 
(1991); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to Indian Tribes and 
Reservation Indians, 26 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 93-95, 99-101 (1991). 
45 See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738 (“It is long settled that ‘the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the 
exercise of its constitutional authority, … if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the courts, even in 
contravention of express stipulations in an earlier treaty’ with a foreign power.”) (quoting Fong Yue Ting 
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720 (1893), and citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 696 (1979)). 
46 See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he broad purpose of the Act 
[was] to protect the bald eagle and prevent its extinction.”); Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973, 974 n. 9 (2005) (citing Bald Eagle Protection Act, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 
250 (1940)). See generally Dion, 476 U.S. at 740-44 (discussing legislative history of the statutes as 
applied to Indians); Kevin J. Worthern, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons on Religious Exemptions 
from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1004 (2005) (“Just as the federal 
government has a compelling interest in preventing the extinction of bald eagles and other endangered 
species, it could well have a compelling interest in preserving endangered cultures, especially those whose 
roots and current manifestations exist only in the United States.”). 
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Indians,47 is a similar question about Executive power to abrogate treaties.48 The 
constitutional concern in each case has little to do with tribal interests. The Court’s 
interest was the extent of Congressional and Executive authority to abrogate treaties. The 
fact that they were Indian treaties is all but irrelevant. 
 And these five cases are not exceptions. It is a distinct possibility that there are 
fewer federal Indian law cases decided on the basis of federal Indian law principles over 
the course of the history of federal Indian law than one would expect. Of course, while 
those cases do appear to rely upon federal Indian law principles, what is becoming 
clearer to Indian law scholars and tribal advocates with each passing Term is that Court 
no longer applies a principled federal Indian law. In the last years of the Rehnquist Court, 
the tendency began to appear as an acute trend. 
 
II. The Deplorable State of Federal Indian Law 
 The story begins with the wretched state of federal Indian law. Dean David 
Getches reported in 2001 that tribal interests have lost over 70 percent of cases before the 
Court for the fifteen Terms preceding his article and over 80 percent of cases in the ten 
Terms preceding his article.49 One case upon which Dean Getches focused – Strate v. A-1 
 
47 526 U.S. 172 (1999). For background and commentary, please see JAMES M. MCCLURKEN ET AL., FISH IN 
THE GREAT LAKES, WILD RICE AND GAME IN ABUNDANCE: TESTIMONY ON BEHALF OF MILLE LACS OJIBWE 
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS (2000); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites 
Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1102-03 (2005); Robert 
Laurence, Antipodean Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 533, 542-43 
(2003); Harvard Law Review Association, State Sovereignty—Compatibility with Indian Treaty Rights, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 389 (1999). 
48 See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 188-89 (“‘The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either 
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.’”) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)); id. at 196 (citing El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 
U.S. 155, 167 (1999), a case describing means of interpreting foreign treaties). 
49 Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 280. 
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Contractors 50 – turned much of federal Indian law on its head.51 And that was before the 
2000 Term in which tribal interests won one and lost three cases, two of which were 
nothing short of devastating. These two cases, Nevada v. Hicks and Atkinson Trading,
shocked observers of federal Indian law in both the results and the “ruthless[ness]” of 
their reasoning. If there was any doubt about the Court’s sympathies in relation to tribal 
interests, the 2001 Term resolved those doubts with great clarity – tribal interests would 
find no quarter in the Supreme Court. Others, such as Professor Alex Skibine, note that 
the Court has decided 44 cases since 1988 following California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians,52 with 33 of the cases going against the tribal interests.53 
The scholarship in the field of federal Indian law focuses on three foundational 
principles: (1) Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the federal government;54 (2) 
state authority does not extend into Indian Country;55 and (3) Indian tribes retain 
significant inherent sovereign authority unless extinguished by Congress.56 These 
foundational principles no longer (if they ever did) drive the Court’s federal Indian law. 
The large majority of Indian law scholars have concluded that the recent federal Indian 
law cases – in which tribal interests win perhaps one-quarter of the time, less than 
 
50 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
51 For a description of the impact of Strate in Indian Country, see, for example, Sarah Krakoff, Undoing 
Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 
1216-1222 (2001); Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine, supra note __; Wambdi 
Awanwicake Wastewin, Strate v. A-1 Contractors: Intrustion into the Sovereign Domain of Indian Nations,
74 N.D. L. REV. 711 (1998). 
52 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
53 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, North Dakota Syposium article (2006). 
54 COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, at 2 (“[T]he federal government has broad powers and 
responsibilities in Indian affairs.”) (emphasis omitted). 
55 Id. (“[S]tate authority in Indian affairs is limited.”) (emphasis omitted). 
56 Id. (“[A]n Indian nation possesses in the first instance all of the powers of a sovereign state.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
17 
convicted criminals57 – are an abomination, a derogation of tribal sovereignty and Indian 
interests, and the worst form of judicial activism and assertions of judicial supremacy.58 
Most observers of federal Indian law cases reach the conclusion that – in the words of an 
Eighth Circuit judge who was reversed by the Court in a major Indian law case59 – the 
Supreme Court makes up Indian law as it goes.60 Legal commentators struggle to reach a 
conclusion as to what drives the Supreme Court’s recent Indian law jurisprudence, with 
some commentators asserting that the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” in favor 
of states’ rights has seeped into federal Indian law.61 Others assert that the Court 
disfavors minority rights and follows an “anti-anti-discrimination” pattern.62 Others argue 
that the Supreme Court is engaged in a pattern of race discrimination against tribal 
interests.63 Some assert that the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence is based on knee-jerk 
reactions against the notion of a third type of sovereign government existing within the 
 
57 See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Colorblind 
Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2001) (“Tribal interests have lost about 
77% of all the Indian cases decided by the Rehnquist Court in its fifteen terms, and 82% of the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court in the last ten terms. This dismal track record stands in contrast to the record 
tribal interests chalked up in the Burger years, when they won 58% of their Supreme Court cases. It would 
be difficult to find a field of law or a type of litigant that fares worse than Indians do in the Rehnquist 
Court. Convicted criminals achieved reversals in 36% of all cases that reached the Supreme Court in the 
same period, compared to the tribes’ 23% success rate.”) (footnotes omitted). 
58 For representative views from leading scholars, please see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED 
WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 
(2005); Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 113 
(2002); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV.
431 (2005); Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from 
Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003). 
59 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), rev’g, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
60 Oral Argument of Appellant, Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 
U.S. 1032 (2005) (quoting Judge Wollman at 14:51 of oral argument – “[T]he Supreme Court sort of makes 
it up as they go along.”). 
61 E.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 320-21, 329-30, 344; John P. LaVelle, Sanctioning  
a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex parte Young, Expansion of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian 
Rights in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 787, 863-64 (1997). On the “federalism revolution,” see 
generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-78 (2005); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We 
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 129 (2001) (coining the phrase). 
62 E.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 318-20. For an argument that the Court follows an 
“anti-anti-discrimination agenda,” see RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY, supra note __, at 158-83. 
63 E.g., WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note __; Singer, Canons of Conquest, supra note __. 
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United States.64 Still other commentators argue that the foundational principles of federal 
Indian law are so based in racism and stereotype as to have tainted all modern Indian law 
decisions.65 Another vein of commentary deplores the inefficiencies resulting from the 
Court’s apparent ad hoc decision making in the field.66 There is no shortage of criticism 
of the Court’s apparent deviation from the foundational principles of federal Indian law 
and of an apparent deviation from the Court’s role of protecting the Nation’s minorities 
from the injustices perpetrated by federal, state, and local governments.67 
An additional factor that makes these cases difficult for tribal advocates and 
Indian law scholars to stomach is the consistent high rate at which the Supreme Court 
grants petitions for writ of certiorari in cases featuring Indian tribes, tribal organizations, 
and Indian interests. Since the advent of the “modern era” of federal Indian law in 1959,68 
few Terms of the Court have passed without at least one major decision featuring tribal 
interests. Many Terms feature several cases, in some as many as five.69 Even as Chief 
 
64 E.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43 (1987) (arguing that the Court decided one major Indian law case based 
on its “visceral reaction” to the facts) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). 
65 E.g., WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note __; Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous 
Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 75 (2002); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian 
Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. 
REV. 219. 
66 E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED. LAW., 
March/April 2005, at 38; Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 277-78; Andrew C. Mergen & 
Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 683, 744-45 (1997). See generally Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian 
Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1990). 
67 E.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 
35 TULSA L. J. 73, 101-02 (1999); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __, at 452-60; 
Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 
WASH. L. REV. 69, 118-19 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court’s 
Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 643 (2003). See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, 
Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004). 
68 WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, supra note __, at 1 (naming Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217 (1959), as the onset of the “modern era” of federal Indian law). 
69 The 1997 Term, for example, featured five cases involving tribal interests. See South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); Montana v. 
Crow Tribe of Indians, 523 U.S. 696 (1998); Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, 
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Justices Rehnquist and Roberts lead a Court that hears a smaller and smaller docket,70 
tribal interests continue to be decided before the Court at the same rate.71 Coupling this 
fact with the low win rate for tribal interests has compelled tribal advocates to avoid 
appearing before the Court at all. A great victory for Indian Country in the 21st century 
consists of convincing the Court not to grant certiorari.72 
Since the 2000 Term, the Court has decided several other cases against tribal 
interests. Three are of import for purposes of this Article – Inyo County v. Bishop 
Paiute,73 Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon,74 and, perhaps the most important 
and destabilizing decision in modern federal Indian law, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian 
Nation.75 These cases exemplify the very recent degradation of the foundations of federal 
Indian law by the Supreme Court, but they are mere extensions of a longer trend that can 
be traced back to the appointment of Justice Rehnquist to the Court in 1971 and his 
 
Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 
(1998). And the 2000 Term featured five cases involving tribal interests as well. See Department of Interior 
v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001); C & L Enterprises v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 
645 (2001); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
70 Compare The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 426 (2005) (noting that the Court decided 80 cases in 
the 2004 Term), with Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 304 (1986) (noting that the Court decided 
159 cases in the 1986 Term); see also Posner, supra note __, at 35 (“The number of decisions reviewable 
by the Court is growing; the number of decisions reviewed by the Court is declining.”). 
71 In the 2005 Term, the Court heard Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543 (2006), and Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005). In the 2004 Term, the Court heard City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005), and Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 
(2005). In the 2003 Term, the Court heard South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 541 U.S. 
95 (2004), and United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). In the 2002 Term, the Court heard Inyo County, 
Cal. v. Pauite-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Indian Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 
(2003), United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003), and United States v. White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
72 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Means case a supreme affirmation of tribal sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Oct. 20, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096413861.
73 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
74 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005). 
75 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
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elevation to Chief Justice in 1986.76 While as Chief Justice, he did not write the lead 
opinions in many Indian law decisions, the doctrinal origins of these cases can be traced 
back to the damage done by then-Justice Rehnquist in the 1970s and early 1980s to 
foundational principles of federal Indian law.77 
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s Indian law jurisprudence stretches back to Moe v. 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation.78 In that 
case, Justice Rehnquist rewrote the presumptions and the analytic framework to which 
the Court had been faithful since the beginning of the modern era, Williams v. Lee.79 
Justice Rehnquist’s Indian law cases reversed presumptions in favor of tribal immunities 
to state regulation and taxation;80 replaced bright-line rules favoring tribal interests with 
balancing tests favoring states and local governments;81 eliminated tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers;82 eviscerated tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers;83 
and limited both the federal trust responsibility toward Indian tribes84 and the canons of 
construing Indian treaties and statutes to the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes.85 Then-
Justice Rehnquist efforts in this new Indian law jurisprudence did not appear to provide a 
reasonable theory for the decisions or the departures from the hallowed foundational 
principles of federal Indian law. Unfortunately, his attitude about Indians and Indian 
peoples perhaps can be summed up in his solitary and pithy dissent in United States v. 
 
76 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET, AND 
PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxiii (5th ed. 2005). 
77 See generally BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note __, at 192-95; WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON,
supra note __, at 97-113; Johnson & Martinis, supra note __. 
78 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
79 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
80 E.g., Moe, 425 U.S. at 475-83. 
81 E.g., id.
82 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
83 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).  
84 E.g., United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 
110, 127-28 (1983). 
85 E.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586-605 (1977). 
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Sioux Nation,86 where he accused the majority of engaging in “revisionist history” by 
asserting that the Sioux Indians were backstabbing savages.87 
These cases formed a base that have made the Court’s federal Indian law 
decisions since the ascension of Chief Justice Rehnquist easy cases for the Court, with 
many of the most damaging cases being unanimous decisions.88 While some may now 
question the Rehnquist Court’s success in its so-called “federalism revolution”89 and 
other areas where it rolled back the jurisprudence of the Warren Court,90 there is a strong 
argument that the Rehnquist Court did accomplish one very clear task – killing federal 
Indian law. 
 This Part offers a description of federal Indian law as it once was and how it is 
now after the end of the Rehnquist Court. These are two very different eras of federal 
Indian law. 
 A.  Foundational Principles of Federal Indian Law 
 The true foundation of all of federal Indian law includes the treaties executed by 
Indian tribes and the federal government, alongside the thousands of Acts of Congress 
relating to Indians and Indian tribes and thousands of federal regulations promulgated by 
federal agencies administering American Indian policy. In 1941, Felix and Lucy Cohen 
collected the entire body of treaties, statutes, and regulations and reduced them into one 
 
86 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note 
__, at 118-22. 
87 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 437 (quoting SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON,
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)). 
88 E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 
U.S. 520 (1998). 
89 E.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights: Federalism after the 
Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 800 (2006). 
90 E.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense- Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It 
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE 
COUNTER- REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and 
Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L. J. 1 (1995). 
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massive comprehensive treatise – the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, published by the 
United States Department of Interior.91 The Handbook remains today the standard-bearer 
for the collection of federal statutory and treaty law applicable to Indians and Indian 
tribes, but it also remains the clearest source of the general principles and specific rules of 
federal Indian law. The Handbook and its successors (with one notable exception92)
constitute one of the most successful treatises in American law.93 
So much of federal Indian law is the federal law announced by the Supreme 
Court.94 Much of the basis for federal Indian law derives from what Charles Wilkinson 
called the Marshall Trilogy of cases95 – Johnson v. M’Intosh,96 Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,97 and Worcester v. Georgia.98 Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinions in 
Johnson and Worcester, alongside his lead opinion in Cherokee Nation, both declared 
several critical and longstanding common law principles regarding the relationship 
between the federal government, states, and Indian tribes and provided a template for 
 
91 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942) (hereinafter COHEN, HANDBOOK 1942 
ED.); see also Lucy Kramer Cohen, Felix Cohen and the Adoption of the IRA, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST-
HAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 70, 70-72 (Kenneth R. 
Philp, ed. 1986). 
92 The 1958 edition was the product of Termination Era Department of Justice attorneys to revise the 
Handbook – often without new or additional precedent – to reach conclusions opposite to (or limiting) the 
original conclusions favoring tribal sovereignty and Indian rights. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Book Review, 54 
U. COLO. L. REV. 121, 123-24 (1982) (reviewing COHEN’S HANDBOOK 1982 ED.); Ralph W. Johnson, 
Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1036-37 (1997). 
93 The original edition (1942) has been cited by state and federal courts upwards of 200 times; the 1982 
edition has been cited over 400 times; and the 2005 edition has already been cited at least ten times by 
federal and state courts. The disgraced 1958 edition was cited over 100 times; however, many of these 
citations were to inoffensive portions of the Handbook.
94 See CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 
§ 107, at 313 (1922) (“These [constitutional provisions] leave untouched the general field of constitutional 
power to deal with Indian affairs, and it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to build up here a very 
considerable body of unwritten constitutional law.”; citing the Indian Commerce Clause and the Indians 
Not Taxed Clauses). 
95 WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW, supra note __, at 24. 
96 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
97 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
98 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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analyzing and interpreting the law in relation to disputes between the three sovereigns.99 
The holdings of the cases, while significant, nonetheless are secondary to the reasoning 
of the cases, as Justice Baldwin asserted in his Cherokee Nation concurrence.100 
Johnson famously adopted the Doctrine of Discovery as the foundation for land 
titles in the United States.101 The Court held that Indian tribes did not own the land upon 
which they lived and used, but instead the European nations and their American 
successors acquired fee simple title in the land by virtue of discovering the land.102 The 
Court announced that Indian tribes did have the right of possession and use, a right that 
could be extinguished only by the federal government through purchase or conquest.103 
Johnson became the first instance of what the Court now calls “implicit divestiture,”104 or 
 
99 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. __, __ 
(2006). 
100 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
101 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. The case is a foundational case in most first-year property classes, appearing as 
one of the first cases excerpted in property casebooks. E.g. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY 
S. ALEXANDER & MICHAEL H. SCHILL, PROPERTY 3-9 (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 
__-__ (4th ed. __). See also JUAN F. PEREA, RICHARD DELGADO, ANGELA P. HARRIS & STEPHANIE M. 
WILDMAN, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 175-78 (2000). 
102 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. For background on whether the Doctrine of Discovery did confer fee title or a 
mere preemption right prior to Johnson, please compare Miller with Robertson.
103 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
104 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining “implicit divestiture” as “that part of 
sovereignty which the Indian implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status”). For commentary on 
“implicit divestiture,” please see Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over 
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1047, 1053-67 (2006); Bethany R. Berger, “Power 
over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1957, 2046-49 (2004); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate 
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over 
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L. J. 1, 43-48 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 393-
437 n. 243 (1993); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature 
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1160-64 (1990); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural 
Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1617 
(1996); Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society’s Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply 
to Non-Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography ad the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 781, 800-05 (1996); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture 
Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80 
(2000). 
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a finding by the Court that an aspect of tribal inherent sovereignty has been divested105 – 
not by an express Act of Congress106 – but by implication through the lens of federal 
policy and national necessity107 or, as the Court later stated, as a result of the dependency 
of Indian tribes upon the federal government.108 Johnson recognized that history plays an 
important role in contextualizing Indian cases.109 
The second case in the Trilogy, Cherokee Nation,110 held that Indian tribes were 
not “foreign nations” as used in the Constitution for purposes of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.111 The opinion held that Indian tribes did retain aspects of nationality and 
created the label “domestic dependent nations” for Indian tribes, a label that sticks 
today.112 The holding itself is very narrow, with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion being 
curt and somewhat conclusory.113 Only one other Justice joined his lead opinion. Critical 
to the holding was the conclusion that Indian tribes are “dependent” on the United States, 
a conclusion reached through an interpretation of the Cherokee Nation’s treaties where 
they consented to be “dependent” upon the United States for military protection.114 Two 
 
105 See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (“In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original 
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, 
impaired.) (emphasis added). 
106 See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 445 U.S. 130, 148 (1983) (“Only the Federal Government may 
limit a tribe’s exercise of its sovereign authority.”) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 
(1978)). 
107 See Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980) (“Tribal powers are not 
implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes’ dependent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases 
where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National 
Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians 
without federal consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of 
the Bill of Rights.”) (emphasis added). 
108 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 229 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001) (quoting Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)). 
109 See Fletcher, The Iron Cold, supra note __, at __. 
110 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
111 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
112 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
113 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15-20; Fletcher, The Iron Cold, supra note __, at __. 
114 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18; Fletcher, The Iron Cold, supra note __, at __. 
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Justices wrote stinging concurrences arguing that Indians and Indian tribes were too 
degraded and insignificant to meet the international law definition of “nation” at all and 
agreeing that Indian tribes were dependent.115 Justice Thompson, joined by Justice Story, 
later added a dissent that argued for finding that Indian tribes such as the Cherokee 
Nation are foreign nations, whether understood to be so by the Founders or not.116 
Applying international law principles, the dissent argued that the Cherokee Nation did 
not lose its status as a foreign nation by virtue of agreeing to be dependent on the United 
States for military protection any more than (using a more contemporary analog) Monaco 
or the Vatican loses its status as a nation by virtue of their military dependence on their 
host countries.117 
The final piece of the Trilogy is Worcester,118 where Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion garnered a 5-1 majority holding that the laws of the State of Georgia do not 
extend into Indian Country where they conflict with federal laws or Indian treaties. 
Worcester laid the framework for analyzing disputes involving Indian tribes by looking 
first and foremost to Indian treaties119 and then Acts of Congress.120 The opinion departed 
from Cherokee Nation’s labeling of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” and 
adopted the reasoning of the dissenters in Cherokee Nation, dropping the label “domestic 
dependent nation” in favor of “distinct, independent political communities.”121 Of course, 
Chief Justice Marshall retired a few years later and no later opinion adopted this phrase 
or extended the reasoning. In the last few decades, the Court almost never cites Worcester 
115 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 31 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
116 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 50 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
117 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
118 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
119 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547 (interpreting the treaty term, “protection”); id. at 553-54 (interpreting the 
treaty term, “manage all their affairs”). 
120 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 540-41 (reviewing the Trade and Intercourse Acts). 
121 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557-58. 
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for any proposition other than the undisputed tenet that it recognizes that tribes retain 
some sovereignty.122 In the Court’s phrasing, it has long ago departed from the “platonic 
notion” that state law has no force in Indian Country.123 
Critical foundational principles of federal Indian law originated with the Trilogy. 
First, Indian tribes and individual Indians did not own their traditional and aboriginal 
territories in fee simple – the United States did.124 Second, federal authority in the field of 
Indian affairs is both plenary (by virtue of Indian dependency) and exclusive (by virtue of 
federal constitutional supremacy).125 Third, Indian tribes are nations and retain their 
sovereign authority except as limited by the federal government.126 Other less significant 
but important questions originated in the Trilogy as well. For one, the Court held that 
Indian treaties must be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them.127 While 
the Court is not always faithful to this canon of construction – even in the Trilogy128 – the 
rule is an important part of federal Indian law and even extends to the interpretation of 
 
122 Citations to Worcester’s principles now are made more often in dissent. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 149 n. 40 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 423 n. 2 
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 
791, 792, 795 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 705 n. 3 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
123 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136, 141 (1980), and Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561); see also Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 762 n. 2 (1998) (Stevens, J, dissenting) (“The general notion drawn from 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worchester …, that an Indian reservation is a distinct nation within 
whose boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer analysis when confronted, in the course 
of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete situations.”) (quoting Organized Village of Kake v. 
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962); other citations omitted); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 256 (1992) (quoting Worcester 31 U.S. at 556-57, but 
then asserting, “The platonic notions of Indian sovereignty that guided Chief Justice Marshall have, over 
time, lost their independent sway.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451 nn. 
1-2 (Blackmun, concurring and dissenting); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 
527 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
124 See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. 
125 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557-58, 561. 
126 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15-20; COHEN, HANDBOOK 1942 ED., supra note __, at 122  
127 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546-47. 
128 See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17-18 (interpreting the treaty term “protection” to the detriment of the 
Cherokee Nation). 
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statutes enacted for the benefit of Indians or Indian tribes.129 For another, the Court’s 
conclusions about tribal dependency and weakness provided the theoretical basis for the 
special relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government, a relationship 
often referred to as a trust relationship.130 According to the Court, tribal dependency 
requires the government to treat Indians and tribes with special fairness and 
consideration.131 While the Court often refused to condemn federal government actions 
that appeared to violate this special trust relationship,132 the concept remains an important 
part of federal Indian law and federal Indian policy to this day.133 
B. The Erosion of the Foundation 
 Much like the Contracts Clause jurisprudence of the Marshall Court,134 the 
Marshall Court’s Indian law jurisprudence has eroded over time, although it took a much 
longer time. The Court’s decisions of the past 20 years, in particular, have been at odds 
with the foundational principles as articulated by the Marshall Court, but the Court has 
not gone so far as to overrule any of the cases in the Trilogy.135 In fact, as some scholars 
suggest, the Court appears to take the easy way out by simply ignoring those foundational 
 
129 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, § 2.02, at 119-128. But cf. Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001) (“Nor can one say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably stronger—
particularly where the interpretation of a congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at issue.”). 
130 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, § 5.04[4], at 418-23. 
131 E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
132 E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (refusing to require the United States to 
pay just compensation for taking of tribal property); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) 
(allowing Congress to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaty). 
133 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, § 5.04[4][a], at 419 (“Today the trust doctrine is one 
of the cornerstones of Indian law.”). 
134 See generally Horace H. Hagan, Dartmouth College Case, 19 GEO. L. J. 411 (1931); Horace H. Hagan, 
Fletcher v. Peck, 16 GEO. L. J. 1 (1927); Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and 
the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 648, 685-86 (1988) (acknowledging that many 
commentators believed the contracts clause was “dead” from the Depression era until the 1970s or 1980s). 
135 See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-
First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-Empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV.
443, 471. 
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cases.136 This recent jurisprudence appears sloppy, leading some scholars to suggest that 
the Rehnquist Court was laden with animus toward Indians and tribes.137 As the Court 
itself sometimes recognizes, its decisions in the field are contradictory or even 
schizophrenic.138 The Court appears very uncomfortable and suspicious of Indian tribes 
because the Constitution does not incorporate them into Our Federalism139 and, as a 
result, the Court’s supervisory power over tribal courts is very limited.140 The Court also 
appears very uncomfortable with federal plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs 
where the single provision in the Constitution that authorizes federal control only relates 
to commerce with Indian tribes.141 As Professor Phil Frickey argues, the Court is 
uncomfortable with being unable to reconcile federal Indian law with the rest of its 
constitutional jurisprudence.142 
136 Cf. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra note __, at 1594, 1654. 
137 See generally WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note __, at __. 
138 Cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally Robert 
Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First-Year Contracts, Earthquake Prediction, Gun 
Control in Baghdad, The Indian Civil Rights Act, The Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate 
Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137, 148 (2004) (“It is my opinion, of course, that it is 
possible to hold two contradictory thoughts in one’s mind at one time, and that the complexity of the law 
requires it. Of course, American Indian law is schizophrenic. So is the Clean Water Act. So is the common 
law of contracts. So is the war in Iraq.”); Skibine, The Court’s Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine,
supra note __, at 267 (“With two hundred years worth of un-discarded baggage, and antiquated and often 
contradictory theories, the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence in the field of federal Indian law has 
mystified both academics and practitioners.”). 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218-19 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally 
Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship between the United States and 
Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994); Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Dualism and the Dialogic of Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 
28 (2005); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”:
Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of 
Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R.1 (2003). 
140 See, e.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (holding that a federal 
court may have jurisdiction over tribal court cases but only to the extent necessary to decide tribal court 
jurisdiction); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that the Indian Civil Rights Act 
did not create a cause of action in federal courts except in criminal cases). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
142 See generally Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __. 
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 One can make a reasonable argument that the Court’s decisions in the field from 
1832’s Worcester v. Georgia until 1959’s Williams v. Lee amounted to little more than an 
interregnum where the Court announced very little federal Indian law. That period could 
be best be characterized as a period in which an incredible, rich, and devastating history 
of federal Indian policy landed on Indian people143 while the Court stood by and watched 
like the house by the side of the road (as Ernie Harwell would say), citing to the political 
question doctrine whenever a difficult Indian law question arose.144 
But Williams offered a dramatic interruption of that period in a short opinion by 
Justice Black that recognized the exclusive authority of tribal courts to adjudicate matters 
arising out of Indian Country.145 The holding in Williams was consistent with the 
 
143 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, §§ 1.03[4]-1.06, at 45-96 (describing federal Indian 
policy from 1815 to 1961). 
144 E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 281 (1955); United States v. Alcea Band of 
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946); Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 
335, 339 (1945); Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 623 (1943) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting); Board of Commissioners of Creek County v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 717-19 (1943); United 
States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941); Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians 
v. United States, 277 U.S. 424, 436 (1930); United States v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 485 
(1927); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1914); Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 482-84 
(1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-48 (1913); Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U.S. 
286, 315 (1911); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 357 (1908); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1905); 
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 443, 445 (1903); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 
(1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 308 (1902); State of Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 
U.S. 373, 393 (1902) (quoting Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. 173, 179 (1855)); Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 
481, 487 (1901); United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 532-36 (1900); Stephens v. Cherokee 
Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 483-84 (1899); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271 (1898); United States v. 
Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 293 (1897); United States v. City of Santa Fe, 165 U.S. 675714 (1897); Stoneroad 
v. Stoneroad, 158 U.S. 240, 248, 251-52 (1895); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 468 (1893); 
Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886); 
Beecher v. Weatherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); United States v. 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 
(1876); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 247 (1872); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870); Wilson 
v. Wall, 73 U.S. 83, 89 (1867); In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 756 (1866); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 
462, 469 (1866); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865); People of State of New York ex rel. 
Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. 366, 371 (1858); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. 223, 228 (1850); United States v. 
Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1845); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711, 740 (1835). Cf. Heckman v. 
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 (1912) (holding that the United States may sue to recover tribal property 
from states); Delaware Indians v. Cherokee Nation, 193 U.S. 127, 144 (1904) (holding that dispute between 
Indian tribes is tribal political question not subject to federal court review); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 
222 (1897) (holding that a tribal membership dispute is a tribal political question). 
145 358 U.S. 217, 220-21 (1959). 
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Trilogy’s foundational principles that state law did not extend into Indian Country and 
that Indian tribes retain aspects of sovereignty not expressly divested by Congress.146 The 
result helped to vitalize the development of tribal courts and tribal governments,147 a 
development that continues today at an impressive rate.148 
In the first part of the modern era from 1959 to about 1986, a time I have called 
the “permissive modern era,”149 tribal interests were victorious before the Court in a large 
majority of cases. Professor Alex Skibine estimated recently that tribal interests won just 
under 60 percent of their cases before the Court during this time. While there were 
significant losses later in the period, such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,150 
Montana v. United States,151 and Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes 152 (all of 
which were driven by Justice Rehnquist), the Court abided by the Trilogy’s foundational 
principles in large measure. The Court’s decisions in the area of taxation – cases such as 
Central Machinery v. Arizona Tax Commission 153 and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 
154 – recognized the general rule of tribal immunity from state taxation and recognized the 
inherent sovereign authority of Indian tribes to tax those within their jurisdictions. United 
States v. Wheeler cemented tribal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members in Indian 
 
146 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832). 
147 Cf. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL 
LIFE 91 (1995) (noting that tribes have “an enduring responsibility to provide a local forum for adjudication 
of cases”). 
148 See generally B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in 
Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998); Nell Jessup 
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
285 (1998); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges 
for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313 (1997). 
149 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Culture War against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. __ (forthcoming 2007), manuscript at 4-6, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=882831.
150 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
151 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
152 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
153 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
154 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
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Country.155 That case also reaffirmed that tribal governments are separate sovereigns.156 
And Justice Marshall’s decision in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. in 1985 provided a 
framework for the eventual recognition of tribal court judgments in federal court.157 
Several surprising, even disturbing, lines of cases followed the ascension of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in 1986. A superficial review of these decisions is helpful for now. 
 First, the Court began to reinterpret its 1981 decision, Montana v. United 
States,158 to expand its meaning far beyond the very narrow fact situation presented in 
that case.159 The Court’s decisions in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Reservation 160 and South Dakota v. Bourland 161 served to rewrite the 
relationship between Indian tribes and nonmembers located within their territorial 
jurisdiction by adopting a presumption that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.162 This is the opposite of the meaning of the Worcester case. For some 
commentators, Montana is now the foundational case for the current Court, overruling by 
implication the Worcester decision.163 The Court now treats Montana as the criminal 
jurisdiction parallel to Oliphant, creating the expectation that, sometime in the near 
 
155 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978).  
156 Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
157 471 U.S. 845, 857 & n. 25 (1985) (citing tribal court cases). 
158 450 U.S. 455 (1981). 
159 See Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631, 631 (2006) (describing 
efforts of Justice Souter to expand the Montana general rule). 
160 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
161 508 U.S. 679 (1993). 
162 See John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting 
Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731, 744-47 (2006); Royster, supra note __, at 636-37; Skibine, The 
Court’s Use of Implicit Divestiture, supra note __, at 298. 
163 E.g., Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75, 86-87 (2003); Singer, 
Canons of Conquest, supra note __, at 652. See generally Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 
(1997) (designating Montana as the “pathmarking” case). 
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future, the Court will adopt a bright-line rule eliminating civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, just as it adopted a bright-line rule in Oliphant.164 
A concomitant result of the expansion of Montana is the deterioration of the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal courts that the Court is willing to recognize. In Strate v. 
A-1 Contractors,165 perhaps the most damaging case of all the Rehnquist Court’s Indian 
law decisions,166 the Court called Montana the “pathmarking” case in the field167 and 
sharply limited the exceptions to the Montana rule168 – the so-called Montana 1 and 
Montana 2 exceptions.169 Tribal advocates had presumed that the Court would invoke the 
Montana 2 exception in cases where the clear focus of the case was in Indian Country,170 
but instead the Strate Court all but defined the exceptions out of existence. The Court’s 
decision in Strate came close to being the case that adopted a bright-line rule eliminating 
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the Court’s decision in Nevada v. Hicks 171 
case even closer, with Justice Souter’s concurring opinion providing an argument that 
tribal law is “unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out” as justification for adopting 
the bright-line rule.172 
Second, in Duro v. Reina,173 the Court attempted to expand its prohibition on 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, which it had already done in Oliphant,174 by 
 
164 This is the “open question” as designated by Justice Scalia in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n. 2 
(2001). 
165 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
166 Cf. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do Indigenous 
Peoples Fit within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 384 (2003) (“The Court’s opinion in Strate v. 
A-1 Contractors continued the conception of tribal sovereignty as one essentially limited to tribal 
members.”). 
167 Strate, 520 U.S. at 445. 
168 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456-59; LaVelle, Outtakes, supra note __, at 755-59. 
169 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1981). 
170 See Brief of Petitioners 8-11, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (2001) (No. 95-1872). 
171 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
172 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring). 
173 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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holding that tribes cannot have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.175 
Congress quickly enacted the “Duro Fix,”176 but the doctrinal damage had been done. 
Oliphant was the first case to utilize the doctrine of implicit divestiture since the 
Trilogy.177 Each time the Court finds that an area of tribal sovereign authority has been 
implicitly divested adds an amount of legitimacy to the doctrine by piling precedent on 
top of creaky precedent. Ironically, one could argue that the “Duro Fix” itself served to 
codify the practice, leaving the Court to believe that Congress acquiesces in the judicial 
divestiture of tribal government authority unless it enacts legislation to reverse the 
decisions. 
 Third, the Court declaring some Indian reservations disestablished, such as in 
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,178 or diminished, as in Hagen v. Utah,179 and 
redefining the term “Indian Country” by making the astounding declaration that there was 
no Indian Country in Alaska in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie.180 Part and parcel of 
these cases was the severe devaluation of the canons of construction for Indian treaties 
and statutes.181 
174 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
175 Duro, 495 U.S. at 688. 
176 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004); Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to 
Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 109 (1992); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the 
Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1993). 
177 See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (listing three areas in which the Court 
recognized implicit divestiture: “The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held 
to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of the tribe. 
Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they occupy. [Johnson.] They 
cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations with foreign nations. [Worcester; Cherokee 
Nation.] And, as we have recently held, they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.  [Oliphant.]”) (other 
citations omitted). 
178 522 U.S. 329 (1998). 
179 510 U.S. 399 (1994). 
180 522 U.S. 520 (1998). For a powerful discussion of Venetie, see Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country,
supra note __. 
181 See, e.g., Hagen, 510 U.S. at 424 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Although the majority purports to apply 
these canons in principle, … it ignores them in practice, resolving every ambiguity in the statutory 
language, legislative history, and surrounding circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress, 
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 Fourth, the Court’s Indian taxation jurisprudence, based in part on a balancing test 
developed in part by then-Justice Rehnquist in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes,182 became a muddled mess as the Court, from the point of view of tribal interests, 
interpreted any factor as against the tribal interests. In this area, the Court looks carefully 
for hints that tribal interests are “marketing the exemption.”183 Whenever the Court sniffs 
this intent, the tribal interests do not succeed.184 
Fifth, the Court held in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation that equitable 
defenses applied in cases where Indian tribes or the United States made claims related to 
historical treaty rights or land dispossession.185 Since that decision, and a lower court 
decision dismissing long-standing and powerful Indian land claims in New York state,186 
almost every Indian treaty claim may be subject to dismissal on the basis of equitable 
defenses. With one casual opinion in a tax case, the Court has changed the entire face of 
federal Indian law, adopting a rule that it had been rejecting on a consistent basis for 
several decades.187 
In short, the last 20 years has seen the Rehnquist Court go out of its way to roll 
back federal Indian law jurisprudence, a new jurisprudence that benefits states, local 
governments, and private property owners that come into contact with tribal interests. 
There has been no shortage of legal scholarship criticizing these cases. 
 
where no clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the Uintah Valley 
Reservation.”). 
182 425 U.S. 463 (1976). For a discussion of Moe, see BARSH & HENDERSON, supra note __, at 189-96. 
183 Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980). 
184 E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005); Dept. of Taxation and Finance 
of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994). 
185 See 544 U.S. 197, 217-220 (2005). 
186 See Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006); 
see also Shinneock Indian Nation v. New York, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 28, 2006). 
187 E.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 253 n. 27 (1985). 
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III. Revisiting the Indian Law Canon – Since 1986 
 This Article offers an argument that perhaps it is now time to recognize that the 
field of federal Indian law as argued before the Supreme Court is dead (but not 
necessarily in lower federal courts, state or tribal courts, and in other venues). Traditional 
scholarship and advocacy has failed to persuade the Court that its Indian cases should be 
decided in a different way. Perhaps at one time, the Court agreed to hear Indian cases on 
their own merits, but with the Court’s shrinking docket, that might no longer be the case. 
This Article proposes to look at the Indian law decisions of the Rehnquist Court (and now 
the Roberts Court) with an eye toward finding broader constitutional concerns that 
interest the Court. 
 A. The Shrinking Supreme Court Docket 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s leadership was almost without precedent in the history 
of the Supreme Court. There can be no serious doubt that he brought a great deal of 
stability and legitimacy to a Court shaken by the erratic leadership of Chief Justice 
Burger. One of the salient features of the Rehnquist Court was the decline in the Court’s 
docket. In the final Term of the Burger Court, the Court heard and decided 159 cases.188 
By the end of the Rehnquist Court, the Court heard and decided only 78 cases in the 2004 
Term.189 
The Court’s smaller docket is loaded with cases required to resolve a split in 
authority between jurisdictions, part of its oversight power over federal courts, and a few 
significant constitutional law cases that attract the Court’s interest.190 According to Judge 
 
188 See Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 311 (1986). 
189 See The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 430 (2005). 
190 See generally Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005); Frederic 
Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – And the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006). 
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Posner, there tends to be one kind of case the Court now hears – “rule-imposing 
decisions” in which the Court attempts to “tidy up a field by announcing a crisp rule or 
standard.”191 Professor Schauer argues in turn that, while’s the Court’s ability to decide 
cases as it chooses remains viable, the Court’s actual “agenda” (if it can be called that) 
was far from “the public’s major issues of concern [and] the nation’s first-order policy 
decisions….”192 While at one time, Judge Posner posits, when the lower courts decided 
fewer cases, the Court could serve in a supervisory position over the lower courts,193 the 
Court “has long emphasized that it is not in the business of correcting the errors of lower 
courts….”194 Of course, these analyses beg the question – why does the Court grant 
certiorari in the cases it does? 
 Most commentators and studies suggest that an important constitutional concern 
drives the Court to vote to grant certiorari in many cases.195 Professors George and 
Solimine’s study of the Court’s decisions to grant certiorari in cases decided by the 
federal courts of appeals sitting en banc affirmed their hypothesis that a conservative 
Supreme Court is more likely to hear liberal civil rights decisions by lower courts.196 
Another study hypothesized and then concluded that “[b]ecause Congress cannot easily 
 
191 Posner, supra note __, at 37 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), and United States v. 
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005)). 
192 Schauer, supra note __, at 32. 
193 See Posner, supra note __, at 35. 
194 Id. at 37. 
195 E.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
260 (1991); Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States 
Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 197-98 (2001); Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal & 
Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United States Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2002); Joseph Tanenhaus et al., The Supreme Court’s Certiorari 
Jurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963). Cf.
LAURENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 156 (2006) 
(discussing “issue salience”). Cf. SUPREME COURT RULE 10. 
196 See George & Solimine, supra note __, at 198 (“And our finding that the conservative Rehnquist Court 
was much more likely to review liberal circuit rulings is consistent with the attitudinal model and with the 
strategic account of high court agenda-setting.”). 
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override constitutional decisions, the authors hypothesize that the justices will accept a 
higher proportion of constitutional cases, as opposed to statutory ones….”197 The same 
commentators believed that “[i]n the agenda-setting context, [the Court’s] strategizing 
would take the form of opting out of a statutory mode and into a constitutional one, either 
by (1) rejecting a petition that requires her to interpret a federal act, in favor of one that 
raises constitutional questions; or (2) focusing on constitutional claims contained in a 
petition, rather than on those of a statutory nature.”198 Moreover, the Court may be in a 
position to “create constitutional rules that are extraordinary difficult, if not impossible, 
for Congress to override” because of its certiorari power.199 
What this seems to suggest is that the Court likely is not going to accept an appeal 
on an Indian law matter unless there is a circuit split.200 It would seem that federal Indian 
law on its own does not rise to the level of importance or significance – as defined by 
legal and political elites – to justify taking up space on the Court’s docket. Even before 
the Rehnquist Court began to limit the Court’s docket, the Justices famously denigrated 
the importance (to them) of the Indian cases.201 Moreover, the unusual character of the 
 
197 Epstein, Segal & Victor, supra note __, at 395. 
198 Epstein, Segal & Victor, supra note __, at 408 (citing Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue 
Fluidity of the U.S. Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691 (1995); S. Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in 
the U.S. Supreme Court: A Conceptual Analysis, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 322 
(Stephen D. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982)). 
199 Epstein, Segal & Victor, supra note __, at 430. 
200 E.g., BP America Production v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 637, 643 (2006); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 
198-99 (2004); Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 641 (2005); C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411 (2001); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409 
(1994); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993). 
201 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 57-58 (1979) 
(reporting that Justice Harlan referred to Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), as a “peewee” case); 
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“chickenshit” case); PERRY, supra note __, at 262 (quoting a Supreme Court Justice: “The junior justices 
always gets the crud. As a junior justice, I had my share of Indian cases.”); Neil M. Richards, The Supreme 
Court Justice’s “Boring” Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 401, 403 (2001) (quoting Justice Brennan’s view of 
Antoine). But cf. PERRY, supra note __, at 262 (quoting a Supreme Court Justice: “Actually, I think the 
Indian cases are kind of fascinating. It goes into history and you learn about it, and the way we abused 
some of the Indians, we, that is the U.S. government….”) (ellipses in original). 
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Indian cases – generating a significant amount of confusion amongst those who are not 
experienced in the field – would seem to compel the Court to stay away.202 Finally, with 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor having been replaced by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito, the personal interest in Indian law of those departed 
“Westerners” would seem to portend a further decline in Indian law certiorari grants.203 
In relative terms, these cases are rare and affect few people. Only about a quarter of law 
schools even offer Indian Law as a class.204 Only a limited number of law professors 
know enough about Indian law to be able to discuss the issues in the field with any 
competence. Every Indian lawyer has an anecdote about a law professor dismissing an 
Indian law case as being the exception to the rule not worth discussing.205 
And yet the Court always accepts more Indian cases for review than the field 
would appear to justify given the Court’s limited interest in Indian affairs.206 Perhaps this 
 
202 Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New Realism in Federal 
Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649, 665 (2006) (“As a former Supreme Court law clerk, allow me to 
speculate on what would have happened had Justice Souter asked his law clerks for help in finding out 
about tribal courts. (I do not know if he asked this question.) When I was a clerk, in 1979-80, our best 
research tools were the excellent research librarians of the Supreme Court library. If asked by my justice, 
Thurgood Marshall, to find out all I could about tribal courts—a subject about which I knew nothing—I 
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could locate in the Supreme Court library, the Library of Congress, and wherever else materials could be 
found. There is no way even to guess what those materials would include. Today, a quarter-century after I 
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Internet search engines. And it would be beyond the scope of anyone’s imagination what might result from 
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203 See PERRY, supra note __, at 261 (“And from a Westerner [Supreme Court Justice]: ‘We now have three 
Westerners and we are very concerned about Western water rights and Indian cases.’”) (referencing Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and O’Connor). 
204 See Gloria Valencia-Weber UND Pedagogy Symposium article.
205 Cf. Brief of the University of Michigan Asian Pacific American Law Students Association et al. 10, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), reprinted at 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 7 (2003). 
206 See, e.g., Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __, at 292-93 & n. 109 (“From 1958 to 2000, about 
2.4% (121 of 4853 cases) of the Court’s total decisions on the merits were Indian cases. In the Rehnquist 
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average number of Indian cases decided has dropped in recent years, but the percentage of Indian cases has 
remained the same because the overall number of cases decided by the Court has fallen drastically.”) 
(citations omitted).  
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is explained by the fact that the Supreme Court’s opportunity to make law as a matter of 
common law exists only in admiralty law and federal Indian law.207 If the Court’s current 
caseload of about 80 cases holds in the Roberts Court, then if the Court accepts two 
Indian law cases a year, 2.5 percent of its docket will continue to be Indian law-related. 
In the 2006 Term, the Court has already accepted two cases.208 What attracts the Court to 
federal Indian law? 
 B. Broader Constitutional Concerns at Play 
 While the Court will grant certiorari to resolve circuit splits, those cases do not 
cover the entirety of the Court’s Indian law caseload.209 This Article argues that most 
Indian law cases reach the Court because there is an issue embedded in the case that 
attracts the Court’s attention. This Article will refer to these issues as “constitutional 
concerns.” This Article argues that while the Court may decide concomitant federal 
Indian law issues as part of the overall decision, the constitutional concern is what drives 
the Court, not the Indian law questions. As a result, because the constitutional concern is 
far more important to the Court than the Indian law questions, the Court decides the 
Indian law questions in line with the broader constitutional concern. Only after deciding 
the constitutional concern does the Court turn to the remainder of the case – the Indian 
law portion – that also must be decided. It is in these circumstances that the Indian law 
 
207 Thanks to Joe Singer for raising this point. 
208 See BP America Production v. Burton, 127 S. Ct. 637, 643 (2006); Zuni Public School District v. United 
States Dept. of Education (No. 05-1508). 
209 For example, several Indian law cases in recent Terms did not reach the Court because of a split in 
authority. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005); City of Sherrill v. 
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Indian Community of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003); Nevada v. Hick,s 533 U.S. 353 (2001); 
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); 
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Two other cases, Dept. of Interior v. Klamath Water Users 
Protective Assn., 532 U.S. 1 (2001), and South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of 
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004), while not an Indian law cases per se, involved tribal interests and should be 
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doctrines, far less salient to the Court and therefore far more malleable, become more 
confused and even, as Professor Frickey argued, “ruthlessly pragmatic.”210 
All things must start at the beginning, so we first turn to the Marshall Trilogy. 
Consider Worcester v. Georgia,211 the critical foundational case of federal Indian law 
described at the beginning of this Article. Justice Breyer has spoken recently about this 
case.212 Although Justice Breyer is one of few Justices to have visited Indian Country to 
 
210 Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __, at 460; see also id. at 436 (“ruthless 
pragmatism”). 
211 31 U.S. 5154 (1832). 
212 See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 8-9 (2005); Stephen 
Breyer, The Legal Profession and Public Service, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403, 413-14 (2000). 
Justice Breyer’s remarks are worth reprinting here: 
Consider an important case—one that is often forgotten in courses on constitutional 
law—from 1832 called Worcester v. Georgia. There was a tribe of Indians, the 
Cherokees, who, under a treaty with the United States, had land in northern Georgia. 
Now, this tribe had given up hunting and fishing for better or for worse. They were 
farmers, they had an alphabet, they even had a constitution. Unfortunately for them they 
found gold. I say unfortunately because the Georgians then took the land. They simply 
marched in and took it over. They paid no attention to the treaty. They did pay attention 
to the gold. 
 Now as I said this particular tribe of Indians was pretty civilized. So what did 
they do? They did what any civilized American would do; they hired a lawyer. The 
lawyer was the best lawyer of his day, Willard Wirt, former Attorney General of the 
United States, and he said, “We are going to bring a lawsuit and we are going to fight it 
all the way to the Supreme Court.” In fact, they brought two. 
 In the first, called Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, they simply sued Georgia, and 
the Supreme Court eventually found a reason not to hear it. The Court said this is a matter 
beyond our capability. But then the Georgians passed a law making it a crime to go on 
the Indian Reservation without the permission of the Georgia legislature. Some 
missionaries did go on the reservation. A missionary called Worcester was arrested. He 
was in jail and he brought a lawsuit, in habeas corpus or the equivalent, and said, “I 
cannot be held here because this land belongs to the Indians, not the Georgians, so 
Georgia law does not apply.” There was no way for the Supreme Court to avoid that. 
Here is a person, he is held in prison, he says I am not held correctly under the law 
because there is no law of Georgia that applies, and he asks the Court to order his release. 
After a lot of procedural detail, which I will spare you, he got to the Court and the Court 
decided the case. The Court held that he was right, the land belonged to the Indians. In 
fact, the Court said the Georgians had no basis at all for being there. That is the end of the 
matter. Release Worcester. Give the land back to the Indians. 
 The first thing the Georgia legislature did was pass a law that said anyone who 
comes to Georgia to enforce this ruling of the Supreme Court will be hanged. Andrew 
Jackson, President of the United States, supposedly said (and he said enough such things 
that it is probably true): “John Marshall, the Chief Justice, has made his decision. Now let 
him enforce it.” Nobody did a thing. 
 But then North Carolina, thinking this rather a good idea, said, “We will not 
give the United States customs duties that we owe them because we prefer to keep them.” 
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become more aware of the conditions on the ground,213 it is doubtful that he incorporated 
Worcester into his public speeches for that reason. Worcester is not an Indian law case. 
Before hearing Worcester, the State of Georgia had defied a Supreme Court order staying 
the execution of a Cherokee man by the State for murder – they executed the man almost 
as soon as they received the order staying the execution.214 Strong circumstantial 
evidence supports the notion that the Court must have had Georgia’s defiance in mind 
when they decided Worcester.215 In Worcester, Georgia had convicted four missionaries, 
and sentenced them to several years of hard labor, for violating a state law that prohibited 
white men from setting foot in Cherokee Nation territory.216 The law, part of a whole 
 
Andrew Jackson woke up to the problem and he ended up saying to the governor of 
Georgia, “You must release Worcester.” They had a negotiation and Worcester was let 
out of jail. 
 But what about the land—the land that the Supreme Court of the United States 
had said belongs to the Cherokees, not to the Georgians? The President sent troops to 
Georgia. But did he send them to enforce the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United 
States? No. He sent troops to evict the Indians. They walked along what is historically 
known as the Trail of Tears, to Oklahoma, where their descendants live to this day. 
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215 See Fletcher, Iron Cold, supra note __, at __. Cf. Breyer, Reflections, supra note __, at 9 (“The first 
thing the Georgia legislature did was pass a law that said anyone who comes to Georgia to enforce this 
ruling of the Supreme Court [Worcester] will be hanged. Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, 
supposedly said (and he said enough such things that it is probably true): ‘John Marshall, the Chief Justice, 
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216 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537-41. 
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series of laws aimed at destroying the Cherokee Nation as a viable political presence in 
Georgia,217 violated federal treaties between the federal government and the Cherokee 
Nation.218 The case had powerful implications for federal Indian law, but those concerns 
were secondary to the broader constitutional concerns of the supremacy of federal law 
over conflicting state law and the question of the enforceability of Supreme Court 
mandates.  
 Compare Worcester to the previous case in the Marshall trilogy, decided only a 
year before, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.219 In that case, one Member of the Court 
argued that Indians were worthless savages and Indian tribes were not viable political 
entities.220 Another Justice, following Chief Justice Marshall’s lead opinion, voted on 
narrower grounds but agreed that Indians and Indian tribes were weak and dependent.221 
The Marshall Court was badly fractured over the case, a function of the declining 
influence of the aging Chief Justice and the increasing hostility toward federal authority 
from the newer appointees to the Court.222 But a year later, because of the powerful and 
dangerous potential of the State of Georgia’s defiance of federal law in Worcester, the 
Court issued a dramatic reversal of its position on tribal interests.223 That reversal did not 
derive from a newfound appreciation of the plight of the Cherokee Nation at all. Perhaps 
that reversal happened because the Court began to understand the implications of state 
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defiance of federal law that was beginning to happen in the South. Indian law scholars 
and advocates take from Worcester that the Court had affirmed the separate character of 
tribal sovereignty and the exclusion of state law from Indian Country, but perhaps the 
bigger question was whether state legislatures could override federal law.224 
This pattern – with the Court responding to broader constitutional concerns in its 
Indian cases – began to recur with the advent of the modern era. Consider the following 
quick survey of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions from the 1986 to 2005 Terms. The 
holdings of the cases are stated in a manner that attempts to eliminate or reduce the 
import of the federal Indian law questions presented in those cases. In all but a few cases, 
it appears that there is a non-Indian law question sufficient to decide the case. 
 The following chart attempts to highlight the holdings or reasoning in each of the 
Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court since the 1986 Term began. If possible, 
the “Indian law question” – a holding or analytical reason for a holding that is derived 
from Indian law principles, statutes, or treaties – is separated from the “non-Indian law 
question” – a holding or analytical reason for a holding that could be argued is not based 
in Indian law principles, statutes, or treaties. In some cases, the non-Indian law question 
may be based on a significant fact situation that is unrelated to Indian law that the Court 
does not discuss in detail in its holding or reasoning, but which may nevertheless be a 
driving factor behind the decision. 
Term Case Indian Law Questions Non-Indian Law Questions 
1986 Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 
(1987) 
Holding that non-Indian 
defendants in tribal court 
matters must exhaust all 
(1) Rejecting claims from non-
Indian tribal court defendants that 
principles of diversity jurisdiction – 
224 See Breyer, Reflections, supra note __, at 9; Burke, supra note __, at 530; Gerald N. Magiococca, 
Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 
550 (2002); Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian 
Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REV.
111, 116-17 (1994). 
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tribal court remedies – 
including appeals – before 
they may challenge the tribal 
court’s jurisdiction in federal 
courts;225 
local bias or incompetence – 
counsel in favor of a non-tribal 
forum;226
(2) Relying upon a policy of 
requiring federal courts to “show 
respect for courts of other 
jurisdictions.”227 
California v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 
480 U.S. 202 (1987) 
(1) Holding that P.L. 280 
does not authorize state to 
enforce civil/regulatory 
bingo laws over Indian bingo 
facilities;228 
(2) Holding that federal 
Indian law preemption 
doctrine prevents state from 
enforcing its bingo laws in 
Indian Country;229 
None. 
United States v. Cherokee 
Nation of Oklahoma, 480 
U.S. 700 (1987) 
Holding that the federal 
government’s trust 
responsibility does not create 
tribal property rights;230 
Holding that damage to private 
property rights from the federal 
government’s exercise of its 
navigational servitude over 
riverbeds is not compensable under 
the Fifth Amendment.231 
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 
704 (1987) 
None. Holding that a statute requiring the 
escheat of fractionated interests in 
Indian lands constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking of property 
in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.232 
1987 Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
(1) Holding that the First 
Amendment did not prohibit 
the destruction of a tribal 
sacred site by a federal 
government construction 
project;233 
(2) Holding that the 
American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act did not create a 
cause of action allowing 
Indians or tribes to sue the 
federal government;234 
Holding that the federal government 
has the right as a property owner to 
do what it wants with its own 
property, regardless of an impact 
upon religious practices of certain 
citizens.235 
1988 Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. 
Holding that Indian Child 
Welfare Act precludes state 
Holding that Congress does not, in 
general, intend for ambiguous 
225 Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987). 
226 Id. at 20. 
227 Id. at 21 (citing Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977)). 
228 Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202, 212 (1987). 
229 Id. at 216-21. 
230 Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987). 
231 Id. at 703-04. 
232 Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 712-18 (1987). 
233 Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, 447-48 (1988). 
234 Id. at 455. 
235 Id. at 451-52. 
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Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 
(1989) 
court jurisdiction where the 
domicile of the Indian child 
is Indian Country;236
statutes to be interpreted in 
accordance with state law.237 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. 
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 
(1989) 
(1) Holding that preemptive 
effect of federal legislation 
over state law in Indian 
Country is governed by more 
flexible approaches that 
consider tribal 
sovereignty;238 but that 
federal law did not preempt 
these state taxes of non-
Indian business activities;239 
(2) Holding that rules that 
prevent multiple states from 
taxing the same transaction 
do not apply when one of the 
sovereigns is an Indian 
tribe;240
(1) Holding that the 
intergovernmental immunity 
doctrine was no longer viable;241 
(2) Holding that the due process 
clause does not require that state 
taxes be reasonably related to state 
services provided to the taxpayer.242 
Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408 (1992) 
Holding that tribes do not 
have zoning authority over 
lands owned by non-
Indians;243 
Asserting via dicta that the power to 
zone is critical to defining the 
character of a community;244 
Wyoming v. United States, 
492 U.S. 406 (1989) 
None. Affirmed by an 
equally divided Court.245 
None. Affirmed by an equally 
divided Court. 
1989 Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676 (1990) 
Holding that Indian tribes do 
not have criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians.246 
Holding that there are limitations on 
Congress’s ability to subject 
American citizens to criminal 
prosecution in jurisdictions that do 
not provide American-style criminal 
procedure protections.247 
Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
None. Holding that government 
regulations that impact religious 
practices are presumptively valid 
under the First Amendment.248 
1990 Oklahoma Tax (1) Holding that tribal Asserting in dicta that tribal 
236 Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48-53 (1988). 
237 Id. at 43 (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943), other citations omitted). 
238 Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S 163, 176-77 (1989). 
239 Id. at 186-87. 
240 Id. at 188-89. 
241 Id. at 174-76 (citing James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937)). 
242 Id. at 189-91. 
243 Brendale, 492 U.S. 408, 428-32 (1992) (plurality opinion) (White, J.). 
244 Id. at 433-34 (Stevens, J.) (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 388 (1926)); see also 
id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1, 
13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
245 Wyoming, 492 U.S. 406, 406 (1989). See generally Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra 
note __, at 1640-41 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s draft opinion, withdrawn when she recused herself 
from the case). 
246 Duro, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). Congress overturned the result in Duro in 1991. See United States v. 
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, __ (2004). 
247 Id. at 693-94 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)). 
248 Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
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Commission v. Citizen 
Band Potawatomi Indian 
Nation of Oklahoma, 498 
U.S. 505 (1991) 
sovereign immunity is not 
waived when a tribe sues, 
seeking an injunction against 
a state government action;249
(2) Holding that tribal 
sovereign immunity does not 
impermissibly burden state 
taxation administration;250 
(3) Holding that land held in 
trust by the federal 
government for the benefit of 
Indian tribes is reservation 
land;251 
(4) Holding that tribe must 
assist the state in collecting 
valid state taxes;252 
officials may be sued to recover 
damages to the state.253 
Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak and 
Circle Village, 501 U.S. 
775 (1991) 
Holding that 28 U.S.C. § 
1362, authorizing Indian 
tribes to bring suits in federal 
courts, does not waive state 
sovereign immunity;254 
(1) Holding that state sovereign 
immunity bars suits from foreign 
sovereigns;255 
(2) Holding that Congressional 
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity must be clear and 
express.256 
1991 County of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of Yakima Indian 
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 
(1992) 
Holding that federal statute 
removing restrictions on 
alienation on certain Indian 
lands renders the lands 
taxable by states;257
Holding that repeals of statutes by 
implication are not favored.258 
1992 Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 
U.S. 99 (1993) 
Holding that the Kansas Act 
conferred state jurisdiction 
over criminal acts by Indians 
in Kansas Indian Country;259 
Holding that the plain meaning of a 
statute must be given effect.260 
Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Sac & Fox 
Nation, 508 U.S. 114 
(1993) 
Holding that state taxes 
within Indian Country are 
presumably preempted by 
federal or tribal law.261 
None. 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 
182 (1993) 
Holding that the trust 
relationship between the 
federal government and 
Indian tribes does not cabin 
Holding that the allocation of funds 
from a lump-sum Congressional 
appropriation is committed entirely 
to agency discretion and is therefore 
249 Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1991). 
250 Id. at 510. 
251 Id. at 511. 
252 Id. at 512-13. 
253 Id. at 514 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). 
254 Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775, 783-85 (1991). 
255 Id. at 780 (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)). 
256 Id. at 786 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)). 
257 County of Yakima, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992). 
258 Id. at 262 (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). 
259 Negonsott, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993). 
260 Id. at 104-06 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982); Moskal v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)). 
261 Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 127 (1993). 
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the discretion of federal 
agencies;262 
not subject to administrative 
review.263 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 
508 U.S. 679 (1993) 
Holding that Indian tribes do 
not have authority to regulate 
non-Indian activities on non-
Indian owned lands;264 
Holding that Congressional taking 
of Indian lands, with a concomitant 
delegation of agency authority to 
administer that property, excluded 
other sovereigns from regulating 
those lands.265 
1993 Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399 (1993) 
Holding that Congress 
intended to diminish the 
Uintah Indian Reservation;266 
(1) Holding that Congressional 
intent in restoring lands to the 
“public domain” extinguished the 
previous federal use or purpose;267
(2) Holding that the Court will not 
rely upon the views of subsequent 
Congresses in order to determine 
the intent of earlier Congressional 
Acts.268 
Department of Taxation 
and Finance of New York 
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros, 
Inc., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) 
Holding that states have 
interest in enforcing their tax 
schemes sufficient to require 
tribes to assist in collection 
of those taxes;269 
Indian trader statute does not 
preempt state tax 
enforcement scheme.270 
None. 
1994 Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Chickasaw 
Nation, 515 U.S. 450 
(1995) 
Holding that a categorical 
rule applies denying state 
authority to tax within Indian 
Country;271 
(1) Holding that tax administration 
requires predictability and not 
“economic reality,” and adopting 
legal incidence of tax as guiding 
factor to apply;272 
(2) Affirming “reasonable” 
interpretation of state law by lower 
federal court;273 
(3) Holding that states may tax all 
the income of its residents, even 
income earned outside the state’s 
jurisdiction;274 
(4) Rejecting claim that employees 
of one sovereign are exempt from 
taxes of another sovereign.275 
262 Lincoln, 508 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1993). 
263 Id. at 192-94. 
264 Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687-89 (1993). 
265 Id. at 689-90 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460d). 
266 Hagen, 510 U.S. 399, 410-21 (1994). 
267 Id. at 412-13. 
268 Id. at 420 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)). 
269 Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. 61, 73-74 (1994). 
270 Id. at 77-78. 
271 Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458 (1995). 
272 Id. at 459-60. 
273 Id. at 461. 
274 Id. at 462-63 (citing New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1937)). 
275 Id. at 466 (citing Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 480 (1939)). 
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1995 Seminole Tribe of Florida 
of Florida v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996) 
Holding that the Indian 
Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to 
abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in federal 
courts;276 
Holding that the doctrine of Ex 
parte Young may not be used to sue 
state officials;277
Congressional power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity must 
derive from a constitutional power 
that grants Congress the power to 
abrogate.278 
1996 Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) 
None. Holding that state officers may not 
be sued under Ex parte Young 
except in order to enjoin plainly 
ultra vires under state law.279 
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 
U.S. 234 (1997)   
None. (1) Holding that escheat provision 
of Indian Land Consolidation Act 
violates the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment;280 
(2) dissenting Justice argued that 
there was federal government 
interest in “removing legal 
impediments to the productive 
development of real estate.”281 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 
520 U.S. 438 (1997)  
Holding that Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 455 
(1981), is “pathmarking” 
case in federal Indian law;282 
Holding that a highway running 
through an Indian reservation in 
accordance with a federal easement 
that is patrolled by state law 
enforcement and maintained by the 
state is not Indian land.283 
1997 South Dakota v. Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 
(1998)  
Holding that land surplus act 
diminished Indian 
reservation;284 
Holding that the state had 
jurisdiction to regulate a solid waste 
landfill to the exclusion of both 
tribal and federal environmental 
regulatory authority;285 
Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 
(1998)  
Holding that “dependent 
Indian communities” does 
not include lands owned by 
Alaskan Native corporations 
in accordance with the 
Alaskan Native Claims 
Settlement Act;286 
Holding that state construction 
contractors building a school in the 
village using state funds cannot be 
taxed by other sovereigns.287 
276 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
277 Id. at 47. 
278 Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)). 
279 Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1997) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 n. 11 (1984)). 
280 Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1997). 
281 Id. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 529 (1982)). 
282 Strate, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997). 
283 Id. at 450-56. 
284 Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 342 (1998). 
285 Id. at 341. 
286 Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). 
287 Cf. id. at 525. 
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 Montana v. Crow Tribe of 
Indians, 523 U.S. 696 
(1998)  
None. Holding that a nontaxpayer may not 
sue for the refunds of another.288 
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma 
v. Manufacturing 
Technologies, Inc., 523 
U.S. 751 (1998)  
Holding that tribal sovereign 
immunity extends to 
commercial activities outside 
of Indian Country;289 
(1) Holding that a sovereign’s 
immunity extends outside the 
bounds of its territory and even 
extends to the business activities of 
the sovereign;290 
(2) Both the majority and the dissent 
expressed reservations as to whether 
foreign sovereigns should have 
immunity in outside jurisdictions 
when conducting business 
activities.291 
Cass County, Minnesota v. 
Leech Lake Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 524 
U.S. 103 (1998)  
Holding that when Congress 
makes Indian law alienable, 
that land becomes subject to 
state and local taxation.292 
None. 
1998 Amoco Production Co. v. 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 
526 U.S. 865 (1999) 
None. Holding that, in federal land patents 
to private landowners reserving 
federal rights to coal under the 
surface, the patents granted rights to 
coal bed methane gas to the 
patentees and was not reserved by 
federal law;293 
Arizona Department of 
Revenue v. Blaze 
Construction Co., Inc., 526 
U.S. 32 (1999)  
Rejecting application of 
federal Indian law 
preemption test to state tax 
on federal government 
contractor doing business in 
Indian Country;294 
Upholding state taxation of federal 
contractor and rejecting 
intergovernmental immunity 
claim.295 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band of Chippewa Indians, 
526 U.S. 172 (1999)  
Holding that treaty was not 
intended by tribe to abrogate 
off-reservation hunting and 
fishing rights;296 
Holding that no Act of Congress or 
Constitutional provision authorized 
President to abrogate treaty.297 
1999 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495 (2000) 
None. Striking down voting rules 
benefiting Native Hawaiians that 
violated the Fifteenth 
Amendment.298 
288 Crow Tribe, 523 U.S. 696, 713 (citing Furman Univ. v. Livingston, 136 S.E.2d 254, 256 (S.C. 1964); 
Krauss Co. v. Develle, 110 So.2d 104, 106 (La. 1959); Kesbec, Inc. v. McGoldrick, 16 N.E.2d 288, 290 
(N.Y. 1938)). 
289 Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. 751, 754-61 (1998). 
290 523 U.S. 751, 754-61 (1998). 
291 See id. at 759-60  (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605, 1607)); id. at 760-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812)). 
292 Cass County, 524 U.S. 103, 115 (1998). 
293 Amoco Production, 526 U.S. 865, 874-80 (1999). 
294 Blaze, 526 U.S. 32, 37 (1999). 
295 Id. at 34-39 (following United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982)). 
296 Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172, 196-200 (1999). 
297 Id. at 188-95 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)). 
298 Rice, 528 U.S. 495, 512-17 (2000) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
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2000 Department of Interior v. 
Klamath Water Users 
Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 
1 (2001)  
None. Holding that documents prepared in 
anticipation of litigation that are 
exchanged between an Indian tribe 
and the federal government are not 
exempted from the Freedom of 
Information Act.299 
C & L Enterprises v. 
Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 
532 U.S. 411 (2001)  
Holding that arbitration 
award enforcement clause in 
form construction contract is 
sufficient to waive tribal 
sovereign immunity from 
suit;300
Holding that form contract that 
incorporates a state-law binding 
arbitration provision operates to 
waive a sovereign’s immunity.301 
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. 
v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001) 
(1) Holding that tribal civil 
authority over nonmembers 
is invalid unless it meets one 
of the two Montana 
exceptions;302 
(2) Holding that nonmember 
business’s enjoyment of 
tribal governmental services 
does not meet Montana 
exceptions;303 
Holding that where state and tribal 
public safety departments both 
provide services to businesses, the 
tribal sovereign is entitled to charge 
for those services but may not have 
general taxation authority over the 
business or its constituents.304
Idaho v. United States,  533 
U.S. 262 (2001)  
None. (1) Reaffirming that tribal 
government ownership of lands is 
critical to territorial jurisdiction;305 
(2) Holding that Congress intended 
to (and did) reserve interests in 
submerged lands when it extended 
statehood to the State of Idaho.306 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 
353 (2001)  
Holding that tribal courts do 
not have jurisdiction over 
civil rights complaints 
against state officers;307 
Limiting state liability for civil 
rights violations in order to protect 
the operations of state 
governments.308 
2001 Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84 
(2001)  
Holding that Congress did 
not intend to extend a tax 
exemption to tribal gaming 
operations;309 
Holding that canons of interpreting 
statutes do not trump the taxation 
canon that tax exemptions are to be 
clearly expressed by Congress.310 
2002 United States v. White Holding that a federal statute (1) Holding that a federal statute 
299 Klamath Water Users, 532 U.S. 1, 8-16 (2001). 
300 C & L Enters, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001). 
301 Id. at 418-23. 
302 Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. 645, 649-54 (2001) (citing United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 455, 465-66 
(1981)). 
303 Id. at 654-59. 
304 Id. at 654-55 & nn. 6-8. 
305 Idaho, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001) (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 455, 565-66 (1981); United 
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997); other citations omitted). 
306 Id. at 272-81 (citing United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)). 
307 Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364-65 (2001). 
308 Id. at 364-65 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 
257, 263 (1879)). 
309 Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. 84, __ (2001). 
310 Id. at 95 (citing United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 
U.S. 1, 6 (1956); United States Trust Co. v. Helverling, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939)). 
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Mountain Apache Tribe, 
537 U.S. 465 (2003)  
mandated compensation 
from the federal government 
for spoliation of tribal trust 
property;311
does not create a cause of action for 
money damages against the 
government unless it can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating 
compensation;312 
(2) Holding that federal agency 
liable when it allows spoliation of 
trust property.313 
United States v. Navajo 
Nation, 537 U.S. 488 
(2003)  
Holding that a federal statute 
did not mandate 
compensation from the 
federal government for 
breach of fiduciary duty;314 
(1) Holding that property interest 
that is not under the control of 
alleged trustee is not trust 
property;315 
(2) Holding that an agency head 
with discretion to review an agency 
determination may set aside or 
modify any subordinate’s 
decision.316 
Inyo County, Cal. v. 
Paiute-Shoshone Indians of 
the Bishop Community of 
the Bishop Colony, 538 
U.S. 701 (2003)  
None (leaving open the 
question of whether the 
tribe’s sovereign immunity 
precluded the State’s 
action317); 
Holding that a sovereign may not be 
a person as defined under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.318
2003 United States v. Lara, 541 
U.S. 193 (2004)  
Holding that Congress may 
ratchet up or down tribal 
sovereignty;319 
Holding that Congressional power 
in Indian affairs is a 
“preconstitutional” power that is a 
“necessary concomitan[t] of 
sovereignty.”320 
South Fla. Water Mgmt. 
Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of 
Fla., 541 U.S. 95 (2004) 
None Holding that the Clean Water Act 
reaches to point sources that do not 
generate pollution.321 
2004 Cherokee Nation of Okla. 
v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 
(2005)  
None Holding that all federal contracts 
obligations are enforceable where 
there are sufficient appropriated 
funds to cover the costs, necessary 
to “provide a uniform interpretation 
of similar language used in 
comparable statutes, lest legal 
uncertainty undermine contractors’ 
confidence that they will be paid, 
and in turn increase the cost to the 
311 White Mountain, 537 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2003). 
312 Id. at 472-73 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)). 
313 Id. at 475-76 (citing Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985); United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973)). 
314 Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506-11 (2003). 
315 Id. at 506-08. 
316 Id. at 513-14 (citing Michigan Citizens for Independent Press v. Thornburg, 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), 
aff’d by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (per curiam)). 
317 Inyo County, 538 U.S. 701, 712 (2003). 
318 Id. at 709-12 (citing Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). 
319 Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-207 (2004). 
320 Id. at 201 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-22 (1936)). 
321 South Fla. Water Management Dist., 541 U.S. 95, 104-05 (2004) (construing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)). 
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Government of purchasing goods 
and services.”322 
City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. 
Oneida Indian Nation of 
N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005)  
Holding that claims to 
“ancient” Indian sovereignty 
are subject to equitable 
defenses;323 
Holding that land or boundary 
claims for relief by one sovereign 
against another may be barred by 
equitable defenses.324 
2005 Wagnon v. Prairie Band 
Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. 
Ct. 676 (2005)  
Holding that federal Indian 
law preemption test does not 
apply to state taxes where 
taxes are levied outside of 
Indian Country;325 
Holding that the tax liability of a 
fuel distributor is incurred upon sale 
or delivery of the fuel to the 
distributor;326 
Dissenters argued that the result 
undermined the possibility of inter-
sovereign cooperative tax 
agreements to resolve these kinds of 
disputes.327 
Gonzales v. O Centro 
Espiria Beneficiente Uniao 
Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 
1211 (2006) (“UDV”) 
None. Holding that federal prosecution of 
persons using a hallucinogenic drug 
as part of religious ceremonies was 
prohibited by the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act.328 
C. Preliminary Conclusions from the Survey 
 The previous survey may lead to some conclusions that might surprise observers 
of federal Indian law. As would be true with any theory, it is impossible to prove with 
any certainty what motivates the Justices in their voting preferences, but in all but a few 
cases decided since 1986 that commentators label “federal Indian law” cases, there are 
significant alternative holdings or reasons unrelated to federal Indian law principles that 
could be used to justify the decision. Moreover, as the years advanced, it could be argued 
that the Court decided the cases less and less on pure federal Indian law. Three of the six 
Indian law decisions made in the 2003 to 2005 Terms have no Indian law issues 
 
322 Cherokee Nation, 543 U.S. 631, 644 (2005) (citing Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 
142 (2002); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884-85 & n. 29 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 
913 (Breyer, J., concurring); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 580 (1934)). 
323 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. 197, __ (2005). 
324 Id. at 218 (2005) (citing Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 651 (1973) (land); Massachusetts v. New 
York, 271 U.S. 65, 95 (1926) (land); California v. Nevada, 447 U.S. 125, 131 (1980) (boundary)). 
325 Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. 676, 688 (2005). 
326 Id. at 684-85 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3408(a)). 
327 See id. at 698-99. 
328 UDV, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1225 (2006). 
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whatsoever.329 In the last ten years, only one case arguably had no non-Indian law 
components to it330 – and every other case (again, arguably) had a non-Indian law case 
with an issue that might have been dispositive of the entire case. Take, for example, 
United States v. Navajo Nation,331 a case vilified by commentators because the Court 
ruled that an apparent arbitrary decision by the Secretary of Interior (in favor of a 
personal friend’s client) was not precluded by federal statute.332 The Court’s decision 
rested in part – and perhaps could have been the crux of the entire decision – on a 
preference for deferring to administrative agencies.333 Or take Nevada v. Hicks,334 a case 
ostensibly about the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts,335 could just as easily be 
characterized as a decision vindicating the sovereign immunity of states and their officers 
in foreign courts.336 Or Inyo County v. Bishop Paiute Community,337 a case about whether 
tribal sovereign immunity can prevent a state government officer from raiding a tribal 
casino facility to enforce a state civil law, turned on whether the tribe or any sovereign 
 
329 See Gonzales v. O Centro Espiria Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006); Cherokee 
Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005); South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 
541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
330 See Cass County, Minnesota v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103 (1998). 
331 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
332 E.g., Editorial, Supreme Court Deals a Win and a Lesson, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 14, 2003, 
available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1047662515 (last visited January 23, 2007); 
For a more nuanced view, see Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-
Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 390-97 (2003); Raymond Cross, 
Reconsidering the Original Founding of Indian and Non-Indian America: Why a Second American 
Founding Based on Principles of Deep Diversity is Needed, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 61, 80-83 
(2004). 
333 See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 513-14 (citing Michigan Citizens for Independent Press v. Thornburg, 
868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) (per curiam)). 
334 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
335 See LaVelle, Outtakes, supra note __, at 759-76; Kimberly Radermacher, Case Comment, 
Constitutional Law—Indian Law: The Ongoing Divestiture by the Supreme Court of Tribal Jurisdiction 
over Nonmembers, On and Off the Reservation—Nevada v. Hicks, 78 N.D. L. REV. 125 (2002). 
336 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364-65 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Tennessee v. 
Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1879)). 
337 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
54 
entity was a “person” under the meaning of federal civil rights statutes.338 Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band 339 is perhaps the clearest example of an Indian law dispute posing an 
important constitutional question for the Court to decide. While the origins of the dispute 
involved the treaty rights of the Mille Lacs Band,340 the important constitutional concern 
that may have been more salient for the individual Justices voting preferences was the 
question of whether the President can abrogate a treaty without express permission of 
Congress.341 One could speculate that at least some or all of the five Justices that voted 
for the Mille Lacs Band voted because they believed the President did not have authority 
to unilaterally abrogate treaties – while not having a salient opinion on the treaty 
interpretation questions that followed. 
 Much more empirical work is possible here, for example, to determine whether 
the Court’s certiorari decisions are influenced by a non-Indian law-related constitutional 
concern; whether lower federal and state courts follow this pattern; whether the apparent 
pattern recurs further back in Supreme Court history; and, in general, to provide further 
evidence on the claims made in this Article. 
 The purpose of the survey is to provide a means for discussing the possibility that 
the Rehnquist Court’s decisions where tribal interests are at stake are not federal Indian 
law decisions. This possibility is not so much as raised in the scholarship analyzing these 
cases, with the glaring exceptions of Dean David Getches’ and Professor Phil Frickey’s 
work.342 It is a distinct possibility that the Indian law principles discussed, analyzed, and 
 
338 See id. at 709-12. 
339 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
340 See id. ay 196-200. 
341 See id. at 188-95 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)). 
342 See generally Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note __ (arguing that the Supreme 
Court is in the process of re-molding the foundational principles of federal Indian law to fit within general 
public law); Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note __ (arguing that states’ rights, mainstream values, 
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applied by the Court are no more than window dressing to the broader constitutional 
concerns attracting the Court’s attention. If this is plausible, then the way Indian law 
scholars and practitioners read and analyze the Court’s recent federal Indian law 
decisions must be reexamined. 
 
IV. Identifying the Constitutional Concerns in Future Indian Cases 
 Lawrence Lessig’s compelling article, “How I Lost the Big One,” discussing his 
advocacy before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft,343 should offer important tips 
to tribal advocates.344 Lessig lost the case but provided powerful insights into Supreme 
Court litigation: 
Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an extraordinary 
lawyer, Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, 
Day, Reavis & Pogue. There were three key lawyers on the case from 
Jones Day. Stewart was the first; then, Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer 
became quite involved. Bromberg and Ayer had a common view about 
how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly told me, 
if we could make the issue seem “important” to the Supreme Court. It had 
to seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free speech and free 
culture; otherwise, the justices would never vote against “the most 
powerful media companies in the world.”345 
and colorblind justice drive the Court’s Indian law decisions). Cf. RUBENFELD, supra note __, at __-__ 
(asserting than an “anti-anti-discrimination” principle drives the Court’s civil rights docket). 
343 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
344 See Lessig, supra note __. 
345 Id. at 59. 
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Lessig’s mention of an “important” issue planted the seed, in many respects, for this 
Article. Scholars had long scoured Supreme Court opinions, papers of the Justices, and 
anecdotal evidence from Justices, clerks, and litigants to discover the “important” issues 
that, first, make cases certworthy, and second, compel a member of the Court to vote in a 
certain way. Lessig’s story is a reminder that the “important” issue sometimes is not 
obvious unless we are willing to look in a different direction at the same questions. Indian 
law advocates need to do the same thing. 
 Further consider Professor Lessig’s review of the opinion in his case:  
I first scoured the majority opinion, written by Ginsburg, looking for how 
the court would distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in 
Lopez. The reasoning was nowhere to be found. The case was not even 
cited. The core argument of our case did not even appear in the court’s 
opinion. I couldn’t quite believe what I was reading. I had said that there 
was no way this court could reconcile limited powers with the commerce 
clause and unlimited powers with the progress clause. It had never even 
occurred to me that they could reconcile the two by not addressing the 
argument at all.346 
Lessig’s review of his own case sounds terrifyingly familiar to tribal advocates reading 
their own cases. Critical arguments made by tribal interests that may have had powerful 
sway with lower court judges sometimes go nowhere with Supreme Court Justices – and 
are simply ignored. 
 Tribal advocates are starting to learn the game, but sometimes there’s just not 
enough to work with. For example, early in the 2005 Term, the Supreme Court heard 
 
346 Id. at 62. 
57 
arguments in Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation,347 a dispute between the 
Nation and the State of Kansas over whether Kansas’s motor fuel tax on retailers – which 
was paid by the Nation when the retailers passed the tax through to their customers – was 
preempted by federal law and tribal sovereignty.348 Justice Souter asked the first question 
in both the state and tribal arguments – effectively contextualizing the case – of whether 
the tribe was acting as a government or as a business.349 In fact, the Nation made a 
powerful argument that every dollar of a tax it intended to collect once the state tax was 
lifted would go toward highway repairs and maintenance – a governmental function.350 
The Court all but ignored that argument, refusing to apply the preemption test at all.351 In 
essence, the Court refused to even apply federal Indian law principles on the theory that 
the state levied the tax outside of Indian Country.352 Indian law didn’t even apply in 
Wagnon.
347 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005). 
348 Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 680-81. 
349 See Oral argument at 4, Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005) (No. 04-631) 
(Justice Souter: “My question is, Do we know, from the record, whether the tax that is assessed on the 
distributor is, in fact, passed through to the tribe so that, in economic effect, the tribe is collecting, via pass-
through, the State tax and imposing its own tax and still selling at market prices?”); id. at 25 (Justice 
Souter: “The what’s [the Nation’s] gripe? It wants a bigger profit? … [I]f the tribe is collecting its tax, and 
it does not have a claim to greater taxation or greater profit, then how is its sovereign right as a taxing 
authority being interfered with?”). 
350 See Brief for Respondent 2, Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005) (No. 04-
631) (“The state tax thus interferes directly with a core attribute of tribal sovereignty – the Tribe’s power to 
impose a fuel tax to finance the construction and maintenance of reservation roads and bridges. The State’s 
studied ignorance of the Tribe’s sovereign interest in taxation to support its infrastructure is ironic at best, 
as the power to tax is the very attribute of its own sovereignty that the State purports to vindicate. Despite 
the State’s contentions, this case is not about economic advantage, but about how to accommodate the 
competing interests of two legitimate sovereigns. The State’s solution is to deny the Tribe’s interest in its 
entirety.”); Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 698 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, the Nation operates the Nation 
Station in order to provide a service for patrons at its casino without, in any way, seeking to attract bargain 
hunters on the lookout for cheap gas. Kansas’ collection of its tax on fuel destined for the Nation Station 
will effectively nullify the Nation’s tax, which funds critical reservation road-building programs, endeavors 
not aided by state funds. I resist that unbalanced judgment.”). 
351 See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (refusing to apply the preemption test); id. at 689 (refusing to consider to 
roads argument). 
352 See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 688 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)). 
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 What concern did the Court have when it decided Wagnon? One possibility was 
that the Court was worried that the states and the federal government might adapt the 
Nation’s theory for their own purposes. In critiquing the Nation’s arguments, the Court 
appeared to imply that these federal Indian law principles might translate to state and 
federal tax questions.353 Perhaps the Court was worried that states would demand a 
refund for money they paid in accordance with government contracts to construction 
contractors based out of state where that money could be traced to another state’s taxation 
(a circumstance that occurs with regularity in tribal construction354). Regardless, what is 
clear from Wagnon is that there was no important constitutional concern supporting the 
tribal interests, nor were there significant pragmatic reasons to vote for the Prairie Band. 
 Tribal advocates are at a serious disadvantage in constitutional litigation before 
the Supreme Court. As Justice Thomas pointed out, there is nothing in the constitution 
that reserves tribal sovereignty.355 While this might be the equivalent of Justice Black 
refusing to vote for mandatory busing of public schools in order to implement 
desegregation orders because the word “bus” doesn’t appear in the Constitution,356 
Justice Thomas raised an important question that the Constitution does not answer. Since 
the Constitution does not assist tribal interests as much as, for example, the Tenth 
Amendment assists states,357 tribal interests may have to look to other, more pragmatic 
concerns and consequences that will persuade the Court. Tribal advocates in the Wagnon 
case did attempt to persuade the Court with identifying considerable consequences that 
 
353 See Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 685-86 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1; North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 386 
U.S. 417, 424 (1932)). 
354 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, The Power to Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State 
Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 27 (2004). 
355 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218-19 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
356 See ROSEN, supra note __, at 157. 
357 E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. 
Superior Court, __ P.3d __, __, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, __ (Cal. 2006). 
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would arise from a ruling in favor of the State of Kansas, but these concerns did not 
persuade the Court in that instance. 
 This Part discusses four areas of federal Indian law that are strong candidates for 
Supreme Court review – and suggestions for identifying important constitutional 
concerns – or considerable pragmatic concerns – that will both compel a grant of 
certiorari and garner enough votes to win a case here and there. 
 A. Tribal Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
 1. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
 One area of difficulty for tribal advocates will be the area of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction. As the following discussion shows, there are several constitutional concerns 
that weigh against tribal interests, but there may be some room to persuade the Court that 
tribal criminal jurisdiction is important for pragmatic reasons. 
 The Supreme Court recently decided not to hear Means v. Navajo Nation 358 and a 
companion case, Morris v. Tanner,359 impressive victories for tribal advocates. Means, a 
member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, faces prosecution before the Navajo tribal courts for 
allegedly assaulting his family members.360 He had argued that the Navajo Nation could 
not have jurisdiction over him because he was not a member of that tribe – he was a 
nonmember Indian.361 In 1990, Means’ attorney, John Trebon, had successfully argued 
before the Supreme Court that Indian tribes cannot prosecute nonmember Indians in Duro 
v. Reina 362 and was attempting to re-establish that rule by asking the Court to strike 
 
358 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2006) (hereinafter Means II). 
359 No. 03-35922, 160 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006). 
360 See Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, No. SC-CV-61-98, VersusLaw No. 
1999.NANN.0000013, at ¶ 21 (Navajo Nation Supreme Court, May 11, 1999), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1999.NANN.0000013.htm (hereinafter Means I). 
361 See Means, 432 F.3d at 930-31. 
362 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
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down the “Duro Fix,” upheld in United States v. Lara in a 7-2 decision.363 Lara seemed 
to answer the question of whether tribes could prosecute nonmember Indians, but two of 
the seven Justices in the majority – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor – are 
no longer on the Court. And, of the remaining five members in the majority, one of them 
– Justices Kennedy – said that under a different procedural posturing (an appeal of the 
tribal court conviction), they might have voted to strike down the Duro Fix.364 Justice 
Thomas stated that he’s waiting for the Court to come to its senses in the entire body of 
federal Indian law and is willing to reopen federal Indian law principles that have been 
settled for centuries.365 Both the Means and the Morris cases were appeals of tribal court 
convictions. That left only three Justices in the majority, with new Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito the remaining uncertain votes. In short, a 7-2 Lara decision could have 
turned into a 6-3 decision the other way. But the Court denied the petition for writ of 
certiorari.366 
Counsel for Means and Morris could not have expected to win any of their 
appeals in the tribal courts and lower federal courts because of the decisiveness of the 
 
363 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
364 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The present case, however, does not require us to 
address these difficult questions of constitutional dimension. Congress made it clear that its intent was to 
recognize and affirm tribal authority to try Indian nonmembers as inherent in tribal status. The proper 
occasion to test the legitimacy of the Tribe’s authority, that is, whether Congress had the power to do what 
it sought to do, was in the first, tribal proceeding. There, however, Lara made no objection to the Tribe’s 
authority to try him. In the second, federal proceeding, because the express rationale for the Tribe’s 
authority to try Lara—whether legitimate or not—was inherent sovereignty, not delegated federal power, 
there can be no double jeopardy violation.”).  
365 See id. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I do, however, agree that this case raises important 
constitutional questions that the Court does not begin to answer. The Court utterly fails to find any 
provision of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty. The Court 
cites the Indian Commerce Clause and the treaty power. … I cannot agree that the Indian Commerce 
Clause ‘“provide[s] Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”’ … [quoting 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989)]. At one time, the implausibility of this 
assertion at least troubled the Court, see, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-379 (1886) 
(considering such a construction of the Indian Commerce Clause to be ‘very strained’), and I would be 
willing to revisit the question. Cf., e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); id., at 584-593 (THOMAS, J., concurring).”). 
366 See Means v. Navajo Nation, 127 S. Ct. 381 (2006); Morris v. Tanner, 127 S. Ct. 379 (2006). 
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recent Lara decision. But they brought the cases in a manner strategically designed to 
attract the Court’s attention, gambling that the Court was willing to entertain a challenge 
to the Duro Fix – and all tribal court prosecutions – because Indian tribes are not required 
by federal statute to appoint counsel for indigent defendants.367 Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in Lara seemed to keep the question open.368 Moreover, nonmembers Indians are 
unlikely to be able to vote in tribal elections or are not eligible to sit on tribal court 
juries.369 Justice Kennedy, the force behind Duro v. Reina,370 was particularly concerned 
about tribes that prosecute people without providing these criminal process rights.371 
Even if the Court does not acknowledge an important constitutional concern 
favoring tribal interests, important and significant pragmatic concerns are present in these 
types of cases. Intermarriage between tribes and increased tribal employment 
opportunities are longstanding facts in most tribal communities, guaranteeing the 
presence of a significant population of nonmember Indians on most reservations.372 
Taking away federal recognition of and respect for the convictions of nonmember Indians 
– like the Court did in Duro – created a significant loophole in tribal law enforcement 
 
367 See 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
368 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 207-08. 
369 Cf. Lara, 541 U.S. 208-09 (rejecting Lara’s due process and equal protection arguments). 
370 495 U.S. 676 (1990); see also Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, C.J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Indian tribes should not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers), rev’d sub 
nom., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
371 See Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Constitution is based on a theory of original, 
and continuing, consent of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that the Constitution 
has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the protection of two governments, the Nation 
and the State. Each sovereign must respect the proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and 
duties as to both. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838-839 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., 
concurring). Here, contrary to this design, the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the 
criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring wholly within the territorial borders 
of the Nation and one of the States. This is unprecedented. There is a historical exception for Indian tribes, 
but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own 
tribe. See Duro, supra, at 693…. The majority today reaches beyond that limited exception.”). 
372 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact of Law on Indian 
Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC. REV. 1123, 1143-44 (1994); Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal 
Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 691, 714-15 (2004). 
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that even a lumbering bear like Congress understood needed quick corrective action.373 
The consequences of creating yet another loophole in the tribal-federal-state law 
enforcement jurisdictional scheme in Indian Country (sometimes referred to as a 
“maze,”374) – the first major loophole being the refusal of the Court to recognize tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe375 – could 
be significant to Indian Country. If tribal advocates can provide empirical research that 
shows there was an increase in crime (both qualitatively and quantitatively) by non-
Indians after Oliphant,376 it might persuade a law-and-order Justice that the constitutional 
concerns are not dispositive. 
 Of course, Indian tribes are not states or the federal government.377 State and 
federal law enforcement come from a long history and practice of coercing confessions 
from suspects378 (one of the reasons to guarantee an attorney and a jury of peers379) that is 
missing from most tribes. In fact, the conviction rate in federal courts is astronomically 
high because Indian defendants are far more likely to confess to crimes, a result (it is 
said) of the Indian tradition to admit mistakes in order to allow community healing to 
 
373 See generally Newton, Permanent Legislation, supra note __; Skibine, Power Play, supra note __. 
374 See Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Land: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional 
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976). 
375 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
376 Cf. Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some 
Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 638 (2006). 
377 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal 
governments because they are not arms of the federal government). 
378 See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN 
LAW-ENFORCEMENT (1931); EMANUEL H. LAVINE, THE THIRD DEGREE: A DETAILED AND APPALLING 
EXPOSE OF POLICE BRUTALITY (1930); Note, The Third Degree, 43 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1930), cited in 
Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 473, n. 501 
(1996). 
379 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (“The principles announced today deal with the 
protection which must be given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first 
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way. It is at this point that our adversary system of criminal proceedings 
commences, distinguishing itself at the outset from the inquisitorial system recognized in some countries. 
Under the system of warnings we delineate today or under any other system which may be devised and 
found effective, the safeguards to be erected about the privilege must come into play at this point.”). 
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begin.380 Moreover, Indian tribes often do not have the resources to fund a public 
defender system;381 but neither do tribal courts sentence the guilty to jail as a matter of 
course.382 
There were reasons why the Court didn’t agree to hear the Means and Morris 
cases. First, the Court doesn’t like to reverse a 7-2 decision so quickly after announcing 
it. With the recent turnover on the Court, quick reversals makes the Court look too much 
like a political body, subject to the political whims of its members.383 Second, neither the 
Means nor the Morris case met the list of due process factors that concerns Justice 
Kennedy. Both defendants were not indigent and were represented by counsel in tribal 
court.384 And Navajo law even provides for nonmember Indians like Means to participate 
in tribal politics (which he did) and even sit on juries (he refused to register).385 But the 
next case in the pipeline to the Court might include those factors. 
 
380 See, e.g., CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 244 (2004) 
(discussing a “cultural requirement to full disclosure”) (citing RUPERT ROSS, DANCING WITH A GHOST:
EXPLAINING INDIAN REALITY13-14 (1992)). 
381 See Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public Defenders, 13 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 139, 144-45 (2003). 
382 Cf., e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, § 9.09, at 769 (“Precontact tribal traditions often 
regulated conduct by sanctions which Anglo-American law does not consider penal.”); id., § 4.01[1][a], at 
204-05 (noting that tribes often depended on “mockery, ostracism, ridicule, and religious sanctions” for 
criminal violations instead of imprisonment); WATSON SMITH & JOHN M. ROBERTS, ZUNI LAW: A FIELD OF 
VALUES 50-51 (1954) (noting that murder in traditional Zuni communities was considered a private offense 
– not public – (similar to a tort) and not subject to public punishment). 
383 See ROSEN, supra note __, at 233 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts: “People don’t want the Court to seem 
to be lurching around because of changes in personnel.”). 
384 See Means I, 1999.NANN.0000013, at ¶ 49 n. 11 (“The petitioner's attorney was asked whether Navajo 
Nation law affords criminal defendants all the rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United 
States Constitution during oral argument, and he evaded the question. Although such is not required by the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, criminal defendants in the Navajo Nation court system are entitled to the 
appointment of counsel if they are indigent, and they are entitled to a jury composed of a fair cross-section 
of Navajo Nation population, including non-Indians and nonmember Indians. The petitioner has all the 
rights he would have in a state or federal court. See Navajo Rules of Criminal Procedure (1990).”); Morris 
v. Tanner, No. 99-36007, 16 Fed. Appx. 652, 653-54 (9th Cir., July 24, 2001) (describing motions made by 
Morris, presumably by counsel). 
385 See Means I, 1999.NANN.0000013, at ¶¶ 47-49. 
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 What tribal advocates and policymakers should now be on the lookout for are 
appeals of tribal court convictions of nonmember Indians who are indigent, 
unrepresented, cannot sit on tribal court juries, and who are sentenced to even a single 
day of jail. Russell Means arguably now faces the justice of the Navajo Nation because 
he didn’t meet those requirements. Forward-looking tribes are thinking about funding 
public defender offices and appointed counsel procedures and adopting rules that allow 
for criminal trial juries to include defendants’ peers. And they are wise to do so. 
 2. Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
 In this area, there is not the same importance to the Court’s constitutional 
concerns as there is in the criminal jurisdiction area, but the same questions are present. 
 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Nevada v. Hicks held that tribal courts do not 
have jurisdiction over federal civil rights claims by tribal members against state officers 
for actions that occurred in Indian Country.386 However, the opinion acknowledged an 
open question – “We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember 
defendants in general.”387 In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter raised several questions 
as to whether tribal courts should ever have jurisdiction over nonmember defendants.388 
Justice Souter’s opinion suggests that at least some members of the Court worry that 
subjecting nonmembers to the processes and laws of Indian tribes might be a violation of 
due process.389 There seems to be a worry that tribal laws are “unusually difficult for an 
outsider to sort out.”390 As a response, Indian law scholars have critiqued the very notion 
of implicit divestiture, arguing that the Court’s authority in the area is questionable and 
 
386 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001). 
387 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n. 2. 
388 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375-86 (Souter, J., concurring). 
389 See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85. 
390 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385. 
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flawed.391 Others argue that respect for tribal sovereignty should compel the Court to 
recognize tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers.392 Still others have argued that the 
tribal law that might be confusing to an outsider never applies to outsiders and that tribal 
courts apply Anglo-American law to nonmembers.393 
At one point, the Court acknowledged a concern that divesting tribal courts of 
jurisdiction would be detrimental to tribal self-government and the development of tribal 
institutions,394 but the Court does not appear to be concerned with these questions any 
longer. Tribal advocates should develop pragmatic reasons that would persuade the Court 
that preserving tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers is important. 
 B. Federal Statutes of General Applicability 
 Another area of difficulty is the question of whether federal laws that do not state 
on their face that they apply to Indian tribes actually do apply to Indian tribes.395 Federal 
employment rights statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act396 and the National 
Labor Relations Act397 are silent as to whether they apply to Indian tribes as employers. 
Other federal statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,398 explicitly 
exclude Indian tribes while others, such as certain criminal399 and environmental400 
391 E.g., LaVelle, Outtakes, supra note __. 
392 E.g., Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and Debasement of 
Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L. J. 147 (2000). 
393 E.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common Law, 43 
HOUSTON L. REV. 701-741 (2006). 
394 E.g., National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, __ (1985); Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, __ (1959). 
395 See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note __, § 2.03, at 128-32; William Buffalo & 
Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal 
Employers, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 1365 (1995); Singel, Labor Relations, supra note __. 
396 See Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Commission, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993). 
397 See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002). 
398 See Charland v. Little Six, Inc., 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999) (Title VII). 
399 See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Commission, 327 F.3d 1019 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (Johnson Act). 
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statutes, explicitly include Indian tribes. The federal circuit courts of appeal have adopted 
differing – and one could argue, conflicting – common law tests to determine whether or 
not the federal statute of general applicability will apply.401 
Whether the Court – assuming it agrees to hear a case in this area (it has not done 
so yet) – decides that a federal statute of general applicability will apply to Indian tribes 
most likely will depend far more on the federal policy annunciated by Congress in the 
statute than on foundational principles of tribal sovereignty. Consider a D.C. Circuit case, 
San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. National Labor Relations Board,402 for example. 
Tribal advocates have argued forcefully that foundational principles of tribal sovereignty 
and federal Indian law compel the court to find that the National Labor Relations Act 
does not apply to Indian tribes or their business interests.403 But the case may come down 
to non-Indian law principles: first, whether Congress originally intended the Act to apply 
to tribal businesses in 1935;404 and, second, if not, whether the Act’s scope can change 
over decades to encompass the relatively recent phenomenon of successful tribal business 
operations employing numerous nonmembers. The second issue, even if the D.C. Circuit 
does not reach it, might become an important constitutional reason for the Court to grant 
certiorari in an appeal from either side. 
 C. Tenth Amendment 
 A recent addition to the field of federal Indian law is the Tenth Amendment. Long 
considered to be part of the recognition of the historical fact that the states have little or 
 
400 Cf. generally James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
191 (2006). 
401 See, e.g., Singel, Labor Relations, supra note __, at 702-03 nn. 87 & 94 (listing cases from different 
circuits that follow conflicting approaches). 
402 Nos. 05-1392 & 05-1432 (D.C. Cir.). 
403 See Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 21-34 (D.C. Cir.) (Nos. 05-1392 & 05-1432).  
404 See Singel, Labor Relations, supra note __, at 719-25 (arguing that Congress did not). 
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no stake in the federal-tribal relationship,405 the Rehnquist Court’s buttressing of states’ 
rights appears to have emboldened states’ claims based on the Tenth Amendment against 
tribal interests in recent years.406 There are two major areas in which the states are 
making Tenth Amendment claims. First, states are arguing that the Department of 
Interior’s authority to take land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes – and the 
concomitant immunity from state tax and regulatory authority – violates states’ reserved 
rights under the Tenth Amendment.407 Second, in one state supreme court, tribal political 
activities that appear to interfere with state political activities have triggered the Tenth 
Amendment in a manner sufficient to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.408 The question 
that the Court could decide soon is whether the Tenth Amendment is important enough to 
limit certain exercises of tribal sovereignty.  
 D. Indian Land Claims 
 One final area worth discussing here is the question of longstanding Indian land 
claims. Here, the Court appears to recognize no constitutional concerns that weigh in 
favor of Indian tribes, but there are significant pragmatic concerns. The Court is very 
worried that Indian land claims and other claims to sovereignty with upset the “settled 
 
405 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (“If anything, the Indian Commerce 
Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority 
over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian 
tribes.”); Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985); Cayuga Indian 
Nation v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1307-08 (W.D. N.Y. 1983); Mohegan Tribe v. State of Connecticut, 
528 F. Supp. 1359, 1368-69 (D. Conn. 1982) (quoting National League of Cities v. usery, 426 U.S. 833, 
852 (1976)); AMAR, supra note __, at 107-08. 
406 E.g., Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 189 (D. R.I. 2003), on appeal, (No. 03-2647) (1st Cir.) 
(en banc); City of Roseville v. Norton, 219 F. Supp. 2d 130, 154 (D. D.C. 2002), aff’d, 348 F.3d 1020 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Citizens for Safer Communities v. Norton, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); In 
re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 636-37 (N.D. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Hoots v. K.B., 541 U.S. 972 (2004). 
407 See Carcieri, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90; City of Roseville, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 154. 
408 See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, __ P.3d __, __, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, __ 
(Cal. 2006). 
68 
expectations” of private landowners and state and local governments.409 But, if there are 
significant constitutional concerns, they are property rights that should favor of the tribal 
and federal interests.410 However, these cases are examples of where pragmatic concerns 
appear to trump any constitutional concerns. 
 In 2005’s City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation,411 the Supreme Court rewrote 
the rules on “ancient” tribal claims to sovereignty by allowing – for the first time in 
recent memory and with the last time benefiting private property owners412 – states and 
local governments opposing tribal sovereignty and Indian tribes to raise equitable 
defenses.413 In other words, the Court held that the Nation (and the United States) waited 
too long to bring their claims.414 Although City of Sherrill did not adjudicate an Indian 
land claim (it had already been settled),415 the Second Circuit relied upon the decision as 
the basis for dismissing land claims in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,416 claims valued 
at hundreds of millions of dollars.417 The State of New York and its subdivisions now 
argue in every land claims pleading that too much time has passed to restore tribal 
sovereignty and Indian lands.418 It seems certain that tribes bringing land claims and other 
long-standing claims to sovereignty must traverse this new (and hostile) world of 
equitable defenses in order to prevail. The very notion of an Indian land claim may soon 
 
409 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 218 (2005). 
410 Cf. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1998); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
411 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
412 The last time was Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892). 
413 See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 213-14. 
414 See id. at 217-19. 
415 See id. at 202. 
416 413 F.3d 266 (2nd Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006). 
417 See id. at 268 ($248 million). 
418 And with success. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D. N.Y., Nov. 28, 
2006). 
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disappear. States and local governments may have found their trump card in dealing with 
the troublesome tribal claims to land and sovereignty. 
 But the opponents of tribal land claims may be too smart for their own good. The 
dismissal of Indian land claims on the basis that too much time has passed since the 
transactions in which Indian land ownership passed into the hands of non-Indians and 
non-tribal governments may reduce state and local government liability, but the liability 
could shift to the federal government. Thousands of Indian land claims involving millions 
upon millions of acres now lay dormant, preserved in accordance with a 1982 federal 
statute,419 waiting to be activated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice. Many, if 
not the vast majority, of these land claims are based upon events that transpired long ago 
and could be subject to the equitable defenses the City of Sherrill Court held could be 
applied to “ancient” tribal claims. If these claims are barred by the passage of time, it will 
be because of the failure of the United States to prosecute the land claims. As a result, the 
United States will be liable to the Indian tribes who lost out on their land claims. Tens of 
billions of dollars – and perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars – are at risk as a direct 
result of the City of Sherrill and Cayuga Indian Nation cases. 
 Consider an older case. In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States.420 The posture of the case was most unusual in that both the 
named parties – the Tribe and the Government – asked the Court to affirm a Court of 
Claims ruling.421 The State of Wisconsin, appearing as amicus curiae, was the only party 
arguing in favor of reversal.422 The case arose when Congress enacted the Menominee 
 
419 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b). 
420 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
421 See id. at 407 (citing Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 388 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 
422 See id.
70 
Termination Act of 1954, disbanding the tribal government and transferring the Tribe’s 
assets to a private corporation owned and operated by the tribal members.423 Menominees 
continued to exercise their hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by the 1854 Treaty of 
Wolf River, however, and the State began to enforce its laws and regulations on them, 
culminating in a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision holding that the 1954 termination act 
had abrogated the 1854 treaty rights.424 The Tribe then turned to the federal claims courts 
and sought just compensation under the Fifth Amendment against the United States for 
the loss of the treaty-protected hunting and fishing rights. The Court of Claims held that 
the Tribe wasn’t entitled to compensation because the treaty rights had not been 
abrogated,425 leading to the unusual posture of the argument before the Supreme Court, 
with the United States hoping to avoid liability by convincing the Court to strike down 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision. 
 There are reasons to believe that same scenario could play out in the context of 
Indian land claims barred by equitable defenses – and perhaps it will play out that way in 
hundreds or even thousands of cases. First, in these cases, the basis for bringing a land 
claim is a violation of a federal statute or an Indian treaty provision. The New York land 
claims, for example, arise under the Trade and Intercourse Acts, where the federal 
government had a duty to prevent – and if not prevent, then to seek a reversal of – the 
underlying transactions leading to the land claims.426 In the case of land claims arising 
out of treaty provisions, the claims are based on a treaty provision that places an 
 
423 See id. at 408. 
424 See id. at 407-08 (citing State v. Sanapaw, 124 N.W.2d 41 (Wis. 1963)). 
425 See id. at 407. 
426 See generally Robert N. Clinton & Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal 
Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17 
(1979). 
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affirmative mandate upon the federal government to prevent the dispossession of Indian 
lands. In many, many circumstances, federal government officials participated in the acts 
of dispossession – clear acts of illegality.427 Second, given that the federal government 
often is the only party capable of suing to recover Indian lands or to seek compensation 
because of state sovereign immunity,428 the equitable defense applies against the 
government for failure to act. In effect, the federal government is at fault and therefore 
culpable.429 
Moreover, before any tribe can proceed with a claim under Section 2415, the 
federal government must exercise discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute 
the claim on behalf of the tribe.430 In other words, each Section 2415 claim places a strict 
duty on the federal government. Since 1983, when the government published the land 
claims in the Federal Register,431 the Department of Justice has chosen to take up only a 
few.432 Over two decades have passed since the government published the land claims. 
Given the harshness of the equity rules announced by federal courts, it may already be 
 
427 E.g., Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922). 
428 See, e.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (suit by United States on behalf of Indian tribe 
against state); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, 501 U.S. 775, 783-85 (1991) 
(rejecting tribal suit against state on basis of state sovereign immunity).  
429 In fact, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-394 (1982), in part, due 
to concerns that the United States faced massive liability for failure to prosecute tribal land claims. See 
H.R. No. 97-954, at 6 (1982) (citing Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 366 (D. D.C. 1982), 
aff’d, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23138 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 21, 1982)). 
430 See 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (b) (“That, for those claims that are on either of the two lists published pursuant to 
the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 1982, any right of action shall be barred unless the complaint is filed 
within (1) one year after the Secretary of the Interior has published in the Federal Register a notice 
rejecting such claim or (2) three years after the date the Secretary of the Interior has submitted legislation 
or legislative report to Congress to resolve such claim or more than two years after a final decision has been 
rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required by contract or by law, whichever is later.”) 
(emphasis added). 
431 See 48 FED. REG. 13698 (Mar. 25, 1983). 
432 E.g., Bay Mills Indian Cmty. v. W. United Life Assurance Co., No. 2:96-CV-275, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20782 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2000); Bay Mills Indian 
Community v. State, 626 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. App. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1303 (2002). 
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too late for the federal government to recover. Federal government liability may be 
accruing this moment. 
 
Conclusion 
What remains of federal Indian law in Supreme Court jurisprudence? The 
foundational principles that resonated with the Marshall, Warren, and Burger Courts have 
not been persuasive to the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts. Given the Court’s unwillingness 
to trace these foundational principles to the Constitution, it would appear that these 
principles no longer carry the day. Did these principles ever carry the day in the Supreme 
Court, even for the Courts that created and cemented them? Is “ruthless pragmatism” the 
guiding principle of the Roberts Court’s Indian law cases? Perhaps federal Indian law is 
dead, if it ever existed. 
 Observers of federal Indian law often chuckle when they read in Bob 
Woodwards’ book The Brethren about how Supreme Court Justice Brennan once referred 
to Antoine v. Washington,433 a 1975 case about the prosecution of a pair of Colville tribal 
members, as a “chickenshit” case. Or how Justice Harlan referred to 1970’s Tooahnippah 
v. Hickel 434 as a “peewee” case. Indian law advocates chuckle because, as Colorado Law 
School dean David Getches has written, the Supreme Court accepts far more Indian law 
cases for review than would be expected. In the 1997 and 2000 Terms, the Court heard 
five Indian law cases, a remarkable percentage. On average, the Court has accepted 
between two and four cases every year during the Rehnquist Court era, beginning in 
1986. This number doesn’t seem particularly significant, until one considers that the 
 
433 420 U.S. 194 (1975). 
434 397 U.S. 598 (1970). 
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number of the cases the Court heard in the 1985 Term – the last year of the Burger Court 
– was about 160 cases and the caseload has been declining ever since. In the 2005 Term – 
Chief Justice Roberts’ first year – the Court decided only 80 cases.  
In 1991, H.W. Perry interviewed several Supreme Court Justices and some of 
their former clerks in a study to determine what makes a case “certworthy,” or worthy 
being granted certiorari. In Perry’s book, Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the 
United States Supreme Court, one of the Justices, who identified him or herself as a 
“Westerner,” referred to Indian law cases as “crud cases” worthy of assignment only to 
junior Justices. But in the same breath, the Westerner Justice said, “Actually, I think the 
Indian cases are kind of fascinating. It goes into history and you learn about it, and the 
way we abused some of the Indians, we, that is the U.S. government….” That Justice 
then noted that, in the Rehnquist Court, there were three Westerners and they all had a 
special interest in western water law and in Indian law. Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor are both from Arizona and Justice Kennedy is from California. Given 
that the Supreme Court’s “Rule of Four” states that it takes the vote of four of the nine 
Justices to grant certiorari in any given case, it would appear that in many Indian law 
cases, the three Westerners needed only one more vote to grant “cert.” Perhaps this 
helped to explain why the Court heard so many Indian law cases during the Rehnquist 
Court era. 
 But Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor are no longer on the Court. 
They’ve been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, neither of whom could 
be called Westerners. The only Westerner Justice that remains is Justice Kennedy. Two 
Indian law cases have been accepted this Term already, but upon closer reflection, one 
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realizes they are not cases about federal Indian law principles, but rather are cases about 
statutory interpretation and administrative law. In the 2005 Term, the Court heard only 
one Indian law case, Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians – and that case had 
been granted cert. during the 2004 Term when all three Westerners remained on the 
Court. 
 Is Indian law no longer a favorite of Supreme Court certiorari decisions? 
Consider the cases that the Roberts Court has refused to hear: (1) Cayuga Indian Nation 
v. Pataki,435 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Cayuga land claims 
amounting to more than $200 million; (2) South Dakota v. Department of Interior 436 and 
Utah v. Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians,437 two claims from states arguing that the 
federal law allowing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to take land into trust for Indian tribes 
was unconstitutional; and (3) Means v. Navajo Nation 438 and Morris v. Tanner,439 two 
cases arguing that the federal statute affirming that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians was unconstitutional. While there were plausible reasons for the 
Court to deny cert. in these cases, perhaps the sole Westerner remaining on the Court can 
no longer garner the votes. For the eight non-Westerners on the Court, perhaps Indian law 
simply isn’t “certworthy.” We’ll see how the Roberts Court develops. As many observers 
know, the chief justice argued two Indian law cases before the Supreme Court – Alaska v. 
Native Village of Venetie 440 (on behalf of the State of Alaska) and Rice v. Cayetano 441 
(on behalf of the State of Hawaii), both of which were devastating losses for Indian 
 
435 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2022 (2006). 
436 423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 67 (2006). 
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Country – so we know he is knowledgeable about some aspects of Indian law. One 
question yet to be answered is whether the Chief Justice transforms his professional 
expertise and experience in federal Indian law questions into votes for certiorari.
Regardless, Indian law might be dead after all. The principles that guided the 
Court over the first 200 years of its Indian law jurisprudence are shadows of their former 
selves. And, with the decline in the Court’s docket, there are fewer and fewer cases that 
attract the Court’s constitutional interest in a way that would allow tribal advocates to roll 
back some of the decisions disfavoring tribal interests.  
 
Miigwetch. 
 
